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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err in determining as a matter

of law that a creditor must bring a separate action in order to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance, rather than executing directly
upon the property?

The District Court's determination of this

issue constitutes a legal conclusion.

It is reviewed

for

correctness and is afforded no deference by the Supreme Court.
Territorial Sav, & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah
App. 1989)•
2.

Did the District Court err in ruling that the statute

of limitations barred any action by Burtons to set aside the
alleged fraudulent conveyances by Mr. Wood?

The District Court's

determination of this issue constitutes a legal conclusion and is
reviewed for correctness.
3.

Id.

Did the District Court err in ruling that the Baldwins

were bona fide purchasers of the Lauri Kay property?
appears to be factual in nature.

This issue

However, the District Court

disposed of the issue upon a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, it is reviewed for correctness, and is afforded no
deference by the Supreme Court.

Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n

v. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456, note 4.
4.

Did the District Court err in ruling that Baldwins were

entitled to an award of their attorney's fees as damages against
Burtons?

The District Court's determination of this issue

constitutes a legal conclusion and is reviewed for correctness.
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456.
5.

Did the District Court err in awarding

costs" to Baldwins?

"paralegal

The District Court's determination of this

issue constitutes a legal conclusion and is reviewed
correctness.

Id.

for

6.

Did the filing of bankruptcy by Mr. Wood on April 21,

1983, or his subsequent discharge in bankruptcy on August 15,
1983, affect Burtons' execution upon the Lauri Kay property?
Although the District Court briefly mentioned this issue in its
May 25, 1987 Memorandum Decision, the District Court made no
expressed determination of the issue.

Nevertheless, because this

issue may be dispositive of some aspects of the present appeal,
Appellants have addressed this issue herein.

The issue is legal

in nature, and is reviewed on a de novo basis by the Supreme
Court.

Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d

860, 862

(Ut. 1979).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The following authorities may be dispositive of certain
aspects of this Appeal:
UCA 25-1-15 Rights of creditors with matured claims.
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured,
may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the
time of the purchase or one who has derived title
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim;
or
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy
execution upon, the property conveyed.
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent
has given less than a fair consideration for the
conveyance or obligation may retain the property or
obligation as security for repayment.
UCA 78-22-1.

Lien of judgment.

From the time the judgment of the district court
or circuit court is docketed and filed in the office
of the clerk of the district court of the county it
becomes a lien upon all the real property of the
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the
county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him
at the time or by him thereafter acquired during the
existence of said lien. A transcript of judgment
rendered in a district court or circuit court of this
state, in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed
in the office of the clerk of the district court of any
other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same
force and effect as a judgment entered in the district
court in such county. The lien shall continue for
eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied
or unless the enforcement of the judgment is stayed on
appeal by the execution of a sufficient undertaking as
provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment
ceases.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an execution upon real property by the
Burtons, which culminated in the issuance of a Sheriff's Deed to
Burton Jr. and Emily Burton on May 7, 1987.

Baldwins, who were

the owners of the property on the date of execution, subsequently
filed this action to set aside the Sheriff's Deed based upon the
fact that Burtons' judgment debtor, Willard Wood, had no interest
in the property at the time that Burton's Judgment was docketed.
Burtons deny that Mr. Wood had no interest in the property.
Following the filing of cross motions for summary judgments
by Burtons and Baldwins, the District Court issued its Memorandum
Decision, dated May 25, 1989, which held that Wood had no
interest in the property at the time that Burtons' judgment was
docketed, so that Burtons' subsequent execution upon the property
was wrongful.

The District Court awarded damages to Baldwin
- 4 -

consisting of attorney's fees and "related damages" in the amount
of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-two and 6 6/10 0 Dollars
($7,872.66).

Such judgment included an unspecified amount for

"paralegal costs."

Burtons deny that Baldwins were entitled to

an award of their attorney's fees or paralegal costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

During 1979 and 1980, Max D. Burton, Sr. ("Burton,

S r . " ) , Willard

D. Wood

("Mr. Wood") and Clealon B. Mann

("Mr. Mann") were partners in a land development and subdivision
enterprise known as Woodcove Subdivision.
2.

(R. 046.)

On May 15, 197 9 Mr. Wood and his wife, Tonya G. Wood

("Mrs. W o o d " ) , as buyers, and Ralph L. Kofoed and Elaine
L. Kofoed ("Kofoeds") , as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract, whereby the Woods purchased the Kofoeds'
interest in certain real property ("the Lauri Kay property"),
which is the subject matter of this action.
3.

(R. 226-228.)

On December 19, 1979 the Kofoeds, as grantors, executed

a Warranty Deed in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Wood, as joint tenants,
thereby conveying Kofoeds' interest in the Lauri Kay property to
the Woods.

Said Warranty Deed was recorded December 19, 1979.

(R. 229.)
4.

During

19 8 0 an Agreement was reached between the

aforenamed partners of the Woodcove Subdivision whereby Mr. Wood
and Mr. Mann purchased Burton, Sr.'s interest in the project.
Pursuant to said Agreement, Mr. Wood and Mr. Mann executed a
- 5-

Promissory Note, dated February 6, 1980, in favor of Burton,
Sr. and his wife, Emily A. Burton ("Mrs. Burton") in the amount
of Thirty-five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00).
5.

(R. 046, 233.)

On May 1, 1980 Mr. Wood purported

to convey his

interest in the Lauri Kay property to Mrs. Wood by way of a
Special Warranty Deed.
consideration:

Said Special Warranty Deed cites as

"The sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and

valuable consideration

. . . ."

(Emphasis

in original.)

(R. 007.)
6.

On May 26, 19 80, Mr. and Mrs. Wood executed a Trust

Deed in favor of Valley Bank and Trust ("Valley Bank"), through
which the Lauri Kay property was transferred as security for a
loan from Valley Bank to Woods in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Dollars ($20,000.00).
7.

(R. 560.)

On February 25, 1981 Burton, Sr. and Mrs. Burton

commenced a legal action against Mr. Wood and Mr. Mann in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Case No. C-81-1568, seeking recovery of amounts due under the
February 6, 1980 Promissory Note which were in default, plus
interest.
8.

(R. 046, 231-232.)
On June 9, 1981, Summary Judgment was entered in

said legal action in favor of Burton, Sr. and Mrs. Burton and
against Mr. Wood and Mr. Mann, jointly and severally, in the
amount of Thirty-eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($3 8,500.00)
plus interest, attorney's fees and costs.
- 6-

(R. 047, 234.)

9.

Prior to August 1981, Woods listed the Lauri Kay

property for sale with Jean Lampe, a local realtor.

The listing

agreement was signed by Mr. Wood as the owner of the home.
(R. 501.)
10.

In August of 1981, Gregory Baldwin ("Mr. Baldwin")

and Lynda C. Baldwin ("Mrs. Baldwin") entered into negotiations
for the purchase of Woods 1
property.

interest within the Lauri Kay

During such negotiations, Mr. Wood stated that he was

"under some financial duress," and was willing to take a lower
price on the home."
November

Deposition of Gregory Baldwin, dated

11, 1987 (hereinafter cited as "Baldwin Depo."),

page 5.1
11.

On August 24, 1981 Baldwins received a Commitment for

Title Insurance ("Title Report") prepared by Western States Title
Company
that:

("Western States").
"Judgments

Said Title Report stated in part

have been

. . . Willard D. Wood

searched

in the names of

. . . and none were found of record."

(R. 089-091.)
12.

Notwithstanding the above-quoted statement within the

August 24, 1981 Title Report regarding judgments in the name of
Willard Wood, at the time that Western States issued said Title
Report, its agents had actual knowledge of the June 9, 1981
judgment of Burton Sr. against Mr. Wood.

Western States1 agents

^The depositions of Gregory Baldwin and Willard Wood were
published in the District Court (R. 135-136).

have stated that they "do not recall" the reason that Burton
Sr.'s judgment was omitted from the Title Report.

(R. 110,

138) .
13.

On August 23, 1981 the Baldwins and the Woods entered

into an Earnest Money Agreement for the purchase and
of the Lauri Kay property.

(R. 153-154.)

Money Agreement states in part:

sale

Page 2 of said Earnest

"Acceptance of offer contingent

upon the successful transfer of lien from 2257 E. Laurie Kay
Drive to building property by Valley Mortgage already agreed
upon and

scheduled

1981." [sic]

to close on or before

September 20,

According to the Deposition of Willard Wood, dated

November 11, 1987

(hereinafter cited as "Wood Depo."), page

17, this provision was placed in the Earnest Money Agreement at
the behest of Baldwins.

However, Gregory Baldwin testified that

he was not familiar with the provision.
9.)

(Baldwin Depo., page

The Earnest Money Agreement was signed by both Mr. and

Mrs. Wood as "Seller."
14.

At

the time that Woods

and Baldwins

commenced

negotiations related to Baldwins1 purchase of the property, the
property was listed by Woods for sale at Two Hundred Sixty-five
Thousand Dollars

($265,000.00).

As consideration for their

purchase of the home, Baldwins paid Woods Fifty-seven Thousand
Twenty-four and 33/100 Dollars

($57,024.33), assumed a first

mortgage to Equitable Life Insurance Company in the amount of
Twenty-five Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Dollars ($25,780.00),
- 8 -

and assumed the Woods' obligation to Kofoeds under the May 15,
1979 Uniform Real Estate Contract, in the amount of One Hundred
Twenty-one Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-five and 67/100 Dollars
($121,695.67).
15.

(R. 153; Wood Depo., page 21.)

On September 30, 1981 Woods executed a Trust Deed upon

the Lauri Kay property in favor of Kofoeds in consideration of
Kofoeds1 remaining equity within the property.

Said Trust Deed

was recorded on October 2, 1981. Mr. Wood signed said Trust Deed
because, notwithstanding his execution of the May 1, 1980 Special
Trust Deed to Mrs. Wood, he "still regarded [himself] as having
an interest in said property."

(R. 071; R. 235.)

Mr. Wood also

appears as a "Seller" upon the Sellers' Settlement Statement and
the Buyers' Settlement Statement, each dated September 30, 1981.
(R. 236-237.)
16.

Also on September 30, 1981 Mr. and Mrs. Wood executed a

Warranty Deed upon the Lauri Kay property in favor of Baldwins,
subject only to the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed from Woods to
Kofoeds and the underlying mortgage to Equitable Life Assurance
Company, dated October 16, 1967.

Said Warranty Deed was prepared

by Western States and notarized by their closing agent and was
recorded on October 2, 1981.

(R. 238.)

According to Baldwins,

Mr. Wood executed said Warranty Deed because he appeared "to have
some naked interest of record" in the property by virtue of his
execution of the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed to Kofoeds.
(R. 410; R. 413.)

17.

On February 24, 1982 a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment

was entered in the Burtons v. Wood/Mann lawsuit, pursuant to
which Mann was released from the Judgment, and Burtons reserved
their cause of action against Wood for the balance of the
Judgment, consisting of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-three
and 73/100 Dollars ($4,323.73) plus interest.
18.

(R. 240.)

On April 21, 1983 Mr. and Mrs. Wood filed a petition

for voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States
Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah, Central Division.

Burtons were listed as creditors within

said bankruptcy proceeding.

Kofoeds were not listed as

creditors.

The Lauri Kay property was not listed as an asset of

the Woods.

(R. 242-243.)

Woods were discharged in bankruptcy on

August 15, 1983 and their bankruptcy case was closed on December
15, 1985.
19.

(R. 470.)
During the summer of 1986 Burton, Sr. received a

Notice of Default which indicated that the Lauri Kay property
was about to be foreclosed under the September 30, 1981 Kofoed
Trust Deed.

Upon investigation, Burton, Sr. obtained a copy of a

foreclosure report prepared by Surety Title Company, dated May 8,
1986.

Said foreclosure report indicated that Burtons1 judgment

lien had attached to the Lauri Kay property behind the first
mortgage of the Equitable Life Assurance Company and ahead of the
September 30, 1981 Trust Deed from Woods to Kofoeds.
050-055.)
- 10 -

(R. 047,

20.

Prior to Burton Sr.'s receipt of the Notice of Default

during the summer of 1986, Burtons had no knowledge of the May 1,
1980 conveyance from Mr, Wood to Mrs. Wood.
21.

(R. 047.)

On August 6, 1986 Burtons, through their prior

attorney, obtained a Writ of Execution from the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, upon their
Judgment against Mr. Wood.

Said Writ commanded the sheriff or

constable of Salt Lake County to levy upon and sell enough of the
unexempt personal property or real property of Willard D. Wood to
satisfy the Burtons1 Judgment.
22.

(R. 037.)

On or about August 6, 1986 Burtons, through their

prior attorney, issued a Praecipe directing the sheriff of Salt
Lake

County

to levy

upon

the

interest

of Baldwins

as

"successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood," in the Lauri Kay
property.
23.

(R. 245-246.)
On August 11, 1986 the Salt Lak;e County Sheriff's

Office issued a Notice of Real Estate Levy upon the interest of
"Gregory

Blake

Baldwin

and

Linda

Baldwin

as

successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood . . ."in the Lauri Kay
property.

Said Notice of Real Estate Levy was recorded with the

Salt Lake County Recorder on August 12, 1986.
24.

(R. 247.)

On August 12, 1986 the Salt Lake County Sheriff's

Office issued a Notice of Real Estate Sale upon the interest of
"Gregory Blake Baldwin and Linda Baldwin, successors-in-interest
of Willard D. Wood . . ."in the Lauri Kay property.
- 11 -

(R. 0 08.)

25.

During approximately September of 1986 Max D. Burton,

Jr. ("Burton, Jr.") purchased an assignment of Burton, Sr.'s
interest in the Burton Judgment against Mr. Wood.
26.

(R. 266.)

On September 9, 1986 the Salt Lake County Sheriff's

Office conducted an Execution Sale wherein Burton, Jr. and
Mrs. Burton purchased

the interest of the Baldwin's

"as

successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood" in the Lauri Kay
property.

(R. 075-076.)

Although Baldwins had notice of said

execution sale, they did not attend or object to the sale, nor
did Baldwins subsequently redeem the property.
27.

(R. 262.)

On January 16, 1987 the beneficial interest of Kofoeds

under the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed was assigned to Robert
L. Rice ("Mr. Rice").

(R. 260.)

Mr. Rice is a personal friend

and former Bishop of the Baldwins.
28.

During

approximately

(R. 505.)
January

of 1987, Burton

Sr. engaged in a conversation with Mr. Wood, wherein Mr. Wood
stated that the reason for his execution of the May 1, 1980
Special Warranty Deed to Mrs. Wood was to protect the property
from his creditors, and that he had received no consideration
from Mrs. Wood for the transfer.

(R. 047-048).

Mr. Wood

subsequently testified that the purpose for the transfer was to
protect the property from his creditors, and that he received no
consideration for the transfer.

(Wood Depo., page 12.)

- 12 -

29.

D u r i n g May of

foreclosure

1987, Mr. Rice commenced a

a c t i o n u n d e r t h e September 30,

private

1981 T r u s t

Deed.

(R. 270.)
30.

On May 7,

1987 the S a l t Lake County S h e r i f f ' s

Office

issued a S h e r i f f ' s Deed conveying t o Burton, J r . and Mrs. Burton
the

interest

of

"Gregory Blake Baldwin and Linda

Baldwin,

s u c c e s s o r s - i n - i n t e r e s t of Willard D. Wood . . . " i n t h e Lauri Kay
property.

Said S h e r i f f ' s

Deed was r e c o r d e d on May 8,

1987.

(R. 075-076.)
31.

On June 10, 1987 Mr. Rice bid at the Trustee's Sale on

the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed and received a "Trustee's Deed"
on the property.
1987.

Said Trustee's Deed was recorded June 18,

(R. 269-271.)

32.

On June 18, 1987 Robert L. Rice, as grantor, executed a

Warranty Deed in favor of Derald A. Tilley, as grantee, upon the
Lauri Kay Property.
1987.

Said Warranty Deed was recorded June 18,

(R. 272.)

33.

On October 7, 1987, Derald A. Tilley, as grantor,

executed a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Lynda C. Baldwin, upon the
Lauri Kay property.

Said Quit Claim Deed was recorded on

October 8, 1987. (R. 280.)
34.

On June 22, 1988, Lynda C. Baldwin, as grantor,

executed a Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Lynda C. Baldwin
Trust, upon the Lauri Kay property.
recorded on June 23, 1988. (R. 281.)

Said Quit Claim Deed was

35.

The present action was filed on May 12, 1987.

Plaintiffs were

initially designated

Gregory Blake Baldwin."

(R. 002.)

as

"Lynda Baldwin

The
and

On January 3, 1989 an Amended

Complaint was filed in which Lynda C. Baldwin, in her own name
and on behalf of the Lynda Baldwin Trust, was named as the sole
plaintiff.
Baldwin

(R. 189; R. 281.)

Trust

are

(Lynda C. Baldwin and the Lynda C.

hereinafter

collectively

referred

to as

"Baldwin.")
36.

On March 3, 19 89 Baldwin filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment upon her claims against the Burtons
action.

(R. 423-424.)

in the present

Following the submission of affidavits

and legal memoranda by both parties, the District Court, per the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, issued its Memorandum Decision dated
May 25, 1987
attached

(R. 572-579), a true and correct copy of which is

hereto as Exhibit

"A," in which

the Court held

in

summary:
(a)

that at the time the Burton Judgment was entered

against Mr. Wood, Mr. Wood had no interest within the Lauri Kay
property to which said Judgment could attach;
(b)

that

if Burtons believed

that

the

conveyance

from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was fraudulent Burtons were required
to

file

a separate

action

to

set

conveyance;
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aside

such

fraudulent

(c)

t h a t the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s upon an a c t i o n by

Burtons t o s e t aside the conveyance from Mr. Wood t o Mrs. Wood as
fraudulent had passed;
(d)

that

t h e B a l d w i n s were bona f i d e

purchasers

of the Lauri Kay p r o p e r t y ;
(e)

t h a t t h e September 9, 1986 e x e c u t i o n s a l e and

the May 7, 1987 S h e r i f f ' s Deed t o Burton J r . and Mrs. Burton a r e
n u l l and void;
(f)

that

Burtons

had w r o n g f u l l y

executed

upon

Baldwin's i n t e r e s t within the Lauri Kay p r o p e r t y ;
(g)

that

Mr. Wood f i l e d

for

b a n k r u p t c y on A p r i l

21, 1983 and l i s t e d Burton Sr. as a judgment c r e d i t o r .

Mr. Wood

was subsequently discharged in bankruptcy; and
(h)

t h a t t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g i s s u e of f a c t was t h e

amount of Mrs. Baldwin's damages, including a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
37.

On A p r i l

5,

1991 B a l d w i n ,

through her

attorney,

Dwight Epperson, f i l e d an Affidavit of A t t o r n e y ' s Fees, which s e t
forth,

inter alia,

t h e sum of

Ninety-two D o l l a r s
Forty-five D o l l a r s

($3,192.00)
($245.00)

T h r e e Thousand One Hundred
in a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , Two Hundred

in " s e c r e t a r i a l

f e e s , " and Nine

Thousand One Hundred Ninety-five and 19/100 Dollars
in "paralegal c o s t s . "
38.
attorney,

On A p r i l

($9,195.19)

(R. 641-658.)

17, 1990, B u r t o n s ,

through t h e i r

present

f i l e d a Defendants' O b j e c t i o n t o Proposed Order and
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Judgment Approving Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees and Costs, wherein
Burtons argued that Baldwin was not entitled to an award of her
attorney's fees, secretarial fees or paralegal costs on the
grounds that there was no legal basis

for such an award.

(R. 659-663.)
39.

After conducting a hearing upon the matter of Baldwin's

attorney's fees and related damages on May 14, 199 0, the District
Court entered a Judgment, dated June 4, 1990, which ordered
that Burtons pay to Baldwin the amount of Seven Thousand Eight
Hundred Seventy-two and 66/100 Dollars ($7,872.66), "representing
payment for attorney's fees and related damages incurred by
Plaintiff in this matter, together with interest thereon at the
legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of this
Judgment."

(R. 667-668.)

Said Judgment constitutes the final

Judgment from which this Appeal is taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Willard Wood did have an interest in the subject property at
the time that Burtons' judgment lien was docketed.

In addition,

any conveyance by Mr. Wood of his interest in the property was
fraudulent and, therefore, Burtons were entitled to disregard
such conveyance and execute upon the property pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 25-1-15(2).
POINT II
Burtons' execution upon the property did not involve, nor
did it require, any action to set aside the prior conveyance by
- 16 -

Mr. Wood as a fraudulent conveyance.

Therefore, the applicable

statute of limitations in this case is the eight-year period for
executing upon judgments established by Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-22-1.

In the alternative, an issue of fact exists as

to the date that Burtons should have discovered the fraudulent
nature of Mr. Wood's conveyance.
POINT III
Baldwins were not bona fide purchasers of the property
because they had both constructive and actual notice of the
Burtons1 lien.
POINT IV
Baldwins were not entitled to an award of their attorney's
fees, inasmuch as there is no statutory or contractual bases for
such an award, and Burtons did not exercise bad faith in
conducting their execution on the property.
POINT V
Even if Baldwin was entitled to an award of her attorney's
fees, she was not entitled to recover "paralegal costs" inasmuch
as there is no statutory basis for such an award, and the
paralegal costs claimed in this case were not an adjunct of
attorney's fees.
POINT VI
The discharge of Mr. and Mrs. Wood in bankruptcy on December
15, 1983 had no effect upon Burtons' judgment lien, as specified
in 11 U.S.C. Section 524 and 506(d).
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A R G U M E N T
POINT

I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT BURTONS WERE REQUIRED
TO BRING A SEPARATE ACTION IN ORDER TO SET
ASIDE THE ALLEGED FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES BY MR, WOOD
The District Court held, on page 5 of its Memorandum
Decision:
If Burton believed that the Willard Wood conveyance to
Tanya Wood was a fraudulent conveyance, made to defraud
creditors, then he should have filed an action to have
the said conveyance set aside so that his lien rights
could be perfected. In such action, he would have
named the Woods and the Baldwins as defendant, which
would have given the Baldwins the right to litigate
this issue, and have their due process rights
protected. However, such was never done. Title has
remained at all times in the Baldwins, and was in the
Baldwins at the time Burton proceeded against the said
property. (R. 576.)
Burtons submit that this holding by the District Court was
erroneous as a matter of law, inasmuch as the Utah Fraudulent
Conveyances Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-1 et seq.,2
establishes that conveyances which are made with the intent to
defraud creditors are void, and that creditors may disregard such
^This case is governed by the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances
Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-let seq., which was first
enacted by Utah Laws, 1925, ch. 42, Sec. 1. The Fraudulent
Conveyances Act was repealed by Utah Laws, 1988, ch. 58, Sec. 16,
and was replaced by the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code
Annotated Section 25-6-1 et seq., effective April 25, 1988. The
Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act governs this action because it
was in effect on the date of the alleged fraudulent transfers.
Smith v. Edwards, 17 P.2d 264 (Utah 1932); Blankenship v. Myers,
544 P.2d 314, 324 (Id. 1975). A true and correct copy of the
1977 edition of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act is appended
hereto as Exhibit "B."
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conveyances and execute upon the property conveyed.3
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-8 states:
When conveyance or assignment void.
Every
conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of
any estate or interest in lands, or in goods or things
in action, or of rents or profits issuing therefrom,
and every charge upon lands, goods or things in action
or upon the rents or profits thereof, made with the
intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, or other
persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures,
debts or demands, and every bond or other evidence of
debt given, suits commenced, or decree or judgment
suffered, with the like intent, as against the person
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void.
(Emphasis added.)
Under Utah law, a fraudulent conveyance is not merely
voidable, but

is void

in toto.

W.P. Noble

Mercantile

Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op. InSt., 42 P# 869

(Utah

1894) . When a conveyance is found void under the Utah Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, it is treated "as if the transaction never took
place at all."

Meyer v. General American Corporation, 569 P.2d

1094, 1098 (Utah 1977).

Cardon v. Harper, 151 P.2d 99, 102

(Ut. 1944).
Baldwin argued at length in the District Court that the word
"void" within Section 25-1-8 means "voidable."

(R. 527-529.)

^There are actually two potential fraudulent conveyances by
Mr. Wood in the present case. The first occurred through the May
1, 1980 Special Warranty Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood, which
Mr. Wood admits was performed for the purpose of shielding the
home from his creditors. (R. 048.) The second consisted of
Mr. Wood's execution of the September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed to
the Baldwins. If Mr. Wood's May 1, 1980 conveyance to Mrs. Wood
was fraudulent, then it was void, and Mr. Wood still possessed
his joint interest in the property at the time he executed the
September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed to Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin.
- 19 -

However, Baldwin did not address the Utah cases, including those
cited above, which are to the contrary.

Baldwin also failed to

address Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-15, which states:
Rights of creditors with matured claims. Where a
conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured,
may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the
time of the purchase or one who has derived title
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim?
or,
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy
execution upon, the property conveyed,
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent
has given less than a fair consideration for the
conveyance or obligation may retain the property or
o b l i g a t i o n as security for repayment.
(Emphasis
added.)
This

statute expressly

allows creditors

to disregard a

fraudulent conveyance, and to execute upon property which is
under the name of the fraudulent transferee.

For example, in

Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974), the plaintiff obtained
a judgment against the defendant, and subsequently
post-judgment

garnishment upon a third p a r t y ,

served a

to w h o m

defendant had transferred certain shares of stock.

the

Within the

garnishment proceeding, the plaintiff moved to have the transfer
of stock set aside as a fraudulent conveyance.

The trial court

denied the motion on the ground that such action could not be
taken in a garnishment proceeding and that the plaintiff must
- 20 -

file a separate action.

The Utah Supreme Court reversed the

decision of the trial court on this issue, holding, at page 428:
A judgment creditor may litigate the question of a
fraudulent conveyance in a garnishment proceedings, in
a creditor's bill in equity, or in an execution
proceeding, provided that once contested the burden is
upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
transfer was in fact fraudulent.
The Decision in Jensen is similar to that which has been
reached in other states when construing similar provisions of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
v. Bailey, 564 P.2d 348

For example, in Gagne

(Wash. App. 1977), the debtor quit

claimed a one-half interest in two parcels of real property to
her son. The plaintiffs subsequently obtained a judgment against
the debtor and executed upon the property, which execution was
upheld by the Court at page 349:
A judgment creditor may choose to levy execution
upon a parcel which has been fraudulently conveyed in
whole or in part by the judgment debtor without first
clearing title. One who purchases such a parcel at an
execution sale can clear that title by an appropriate
action. But until that time, the fraudulent conveyance
may be successfully attacked by a superior interest.
(Citations deleted.)
Similar results were reached in the cases of Montana Ass'n
of Credit Management v. Hergert, 593 P.2d 1059 (Mont. 1979) and
Sackin v. Kersting, 458 P.2d

544

(Ariz. App. 1969).

See

generally, 37 Am.Jur.2d, "Fraudulent Conveyances," Section 161.
The District Court's Memorandum Decision suggests that the
literal application of Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-15(2)
would deprive Baldwin of her interest in the real property
- 21 -

without due process.

However, an alleged fraudulent transferee

in circumstances such as the present case can assert any defenses
she may have in the execution proceeding, or commence a separate
action, such as Baldwin did in the present case.
established by Utah Code Annotated

The procedure

Section 25-1-15(2) is

necessary to ensure that the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act
achieves

its purpose of allowing creditors to '"reach all

artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force
and effect in preventing debtors from paying the just claims of
their creditors."

Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah

1987) . 4
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN RULING THAT ANY CLAIM OF FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE BY BURTONS IS BARRED BY LIMITATIONS
On page 6 of its Memorandum Decision, the District Court
stated:
Burton's lien is only to that property owned by
Willard Wood, but Willard Wood conveyed the property to
Tanya Wood on May 1, 1980 and Tanya Wood conveyed the
property to the Baldwins on September 30, 1981. No
action has been filed to set that conveyance aside, and
the Burtons have not so pled in this action. The
statute of limitations has run on bringing an action
for fraudulent conveyance and, therefore, the Court
rules as a matter of law that Willard Wood has no
ownership interest in the property in question, and has
^The Utah Fradulent Transfer Act continues to allow
creditors to execute upon fraudulently conveyed property within
the possession of the transferee, although it appears to require
an express order for such executions. UCA Section 25-6-8(2).
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not had such since conveying away in May of 1980 and,
therefore, Burton can establish no rights to any
interest in the said property.
The District Court's conclusion regarding

limitations

appears to have been based upon its assumption that Burtons were
required to bring a specific action to set aside the fraudulent
conveyance, rather than directly executing upon the property.

As

argued within the preceding Point I hereof, this assumption by
the District Court was error because the Utah Fraudulent
Conveyance Act expressly allowed the type of execution which was
performed by Burtons.
The District Court did not address the issue of when
Burton's cause of action to set aside the fraudulent transfer
accrued.

However, that issue was addressed at length within

Baldwin's Reply Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motions for
Summary Judgment, dated April 24, 1989
"Reply Memorandum").

(hereinafter cited as

On pages 11 through 19 (R. 517-525) of her

Reply Memorandum, Baldwin argues that Burton's cause of action to
set aside the fraudulent conveyance accrued either at the time
that the deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was recorded, or from
the date of Burton's judgment.

In support of this argument

Baldwin cites several cases from other jurisdictions.5
5

Baldwins also assert that the applicable limitations period
for Burtons' claim to set aside the fraudulent conveyance is
established by Utah Code Annotated Section 25-6-10 of the Utah
Fraudulent Transfer Act, and Utah Code Annotated Section
78-12-25(2). These provisions did not become effective until
- 23 -

R e g a r d l e s s of t h e p o s i t i o n s which have been taken within
other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , the law within the S t a t e of Utah i s t h a t the
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s upon a fraudulent conveyance commences a t
the time t h a t the fraudulent conveyance i s discovered.

In Smith

v . Edwards, 17 P.2d 264 (Ut. 1932), the defendants made s e v e r a l
alleged fraudulent

conveyances of r e a l p r o p e r t y t o t h e i r sons,

which were recorded on December 23, 1920.

The p l a i n t i f f s brought

s u i t t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e conveyance in 1928.

In addressing the

defendants' l i m i t a t i o n s defense, the Court s t a t e d :
The p a r t i e s a g r e e the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i s
three years.
T h e y d i v i d e on t h e q u e s t i o n of
discovery. They approach the question d i f f e r e n t l y .
Some a r g u e t h e r e c o r d i n g of t h e deed i m p a r t s
n o t i c e t o a l l p e r s o n s of t h e c o n t e n t s t h e r e o f and
c o n s t i t u t e s such n o t i c e as w i l l s t a r t t h e s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s running as to a c r e d i t o r who may claim t o
be r e l y i n g upon ownership, o r i m p l i e d o w n e r s h i p , of
p r o p e r t y as shown by t h e s t a t e of the r e c o r d . Some
argue o t h e r w i s e . Some a s p e c t s may be examined:
(1)
Was t h e conveyance i t s e l f the fraud? or (2) was i t
fraud because the conveyance purported t o be v o l u n t a r y
or w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n ? or (3) did the conveyance
produce d i s c o v e r a b l e i n s o l v e n c y a t t h e time i t was
made? If the conveyance i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e d the fraud,
i t s r e c o r d a t i o n was n o t i c e of i t s c o n t e n t s t o a l l
persons. . . .

April 25, 1988 and are, therefore, inapplicable to the present case.
The applicable limitations period for any fraudulent conveyances
occurring in the present case is established by Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-12-26(3). Smith Land Co. v. Johnson, 107 P.2d 158 (Utah

1940).
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The conveyances attacked all contain the statement
of consideration of "one dollar and other valuable
considerations" and one of them contains in addition
the statement that two of the tracts are each subject
to a mortgage in the "sum of $1,000.00 which the
grantee assumes and agrees to pay."
Under the statute from the time of filing the
conveyance with the recorder it shall impart notice to
all persons of the contents thereof. From the time of
recording these conveyances all persons, including
plaintiffs, notice was imparted to them that the
conveyances contained the statements above quoted.
That the plaintiffs and all other persons had notice
that such conveyances had been made and recorded seems
to go without saying, for surely, if one is charged
with notice of the contents, he must be charged with
notice of the existence of the document itself. When
the document contains a statement of facts indicating
that there was given for the property a fair
consideration when as a fact no consideration at all
had been given, a very different situation is presented
than a document showing on its face that there was no
consideration or only a nominal consideration. Under
such circumstances all persons would be entitled to
rely upon and would have imparted to them the
information contained in the contents of the document,
and until some information came to hand sufficient to
put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry he would
be entitled to rely upon the contents of the document.
It may be argued that fraud in the first situation
consisted of the false statement contained in the
document, because no consideration passed and there is
the false statement in the document that there was a
valuable consideration. The fraud was committed at
that time but may not be discoverable then. A creditor
would not discover the falsity of the statement until
other information was brought to his attention
sufficient to put him on inquiry.
The Court further stated, quoting the case of Duxburg
v. Boice, 72 N.W. 838, 839 (Minn. 1897) that "Mere constructive
notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for record is not
notice of the facts constituting fraud."
- 25 -

The Smith Court ultimately held that the action was barred
by limitations, based upon the factual circumstances existing at
and subsequent to the time of the conveyances.
27 2.

Smith, 17 P.2d at

However, the Court clearly rejected the notion that mere

constructive knowledge of a transfer, created by the recording of
a deed, is equivalent to discovery of the fraudulent nature of a
conveyance.

See also Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d

1241

(Ut. 1975) .
Subsequent to the decision in Smith v. Edwards, the Utah
Legislature enacted 57-3-2(4) which states:
The fact that a recorded document recites only a
nominal consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or
otherwise purports to be in trust without naming
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does
not charge any third person with notice of any interest
of the grantor or of the interest of any other person
not named in the document.
Under this provision, a statement of nominal consideration
within a recorded deed, such as that from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood
in the present case, does not impart notice of any interest in
the property retained by the grantor.

Therefore, the recital of

nominal consideration within the May 1, 1980 Warranty Deed from
Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was not sufficient in itself to give
constructive notice of the fraudulent nature of the conveyance.
In fact, the recitation of nominal consideration within deeds is
so common that, as a practical matter, such recitals impart no
such notice (See e.g., R. 006, R.143, R. 272.)
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The record before the District Court is devoid of any facts
indicating whether Burtons should or could have discovered the
fraudulent nature of Mr. Wood's conveyances prior to the time
that Burtons executed upon the property.

Woods' bankruptcy in

April of 1983 is not probative as to Mr. Wood's solvency in 1980
or 1981.

There is no evidence of any other judgments or claims

cigainst Woods during the relevant time period.

To the contrary,

it appears that Woods paid off their lien to Valley Bank with
their proceeds from the sale to Baldwins

(Wood Depo., pages

25-26).
If Burtons had conducted a title search on the property at
any time subsequent to September 30, 19 81, such search would have
revealed that their lien had attached to the property ahead of
Kofoeds' Trust Deed.

Burtons would also see that the Kofoed

Trust Deed and the Baldwin Warranty Deed had been signed by
Mr. Wood.

With such information, Burtons could

reasonably

conclude that the conveyance from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood could be
disregarded, and that the property could be executed upon at any
time within the period prescribed by UCA Section 78-22-1.

The

Woods' conveyance to Baldwins would be no problem, since Baldwins
apparently took the property subject to Burtons' lien.
Whether Mr. Wood's conveyances were fraudulent is immaterial
in this case, because both the interest of Mr. Wood in the
property and Burtons' judgment lien were of record at the time
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that Baldwins purchased the property, and because UCA Section
25-1-15(2) allowed Burtons to disregard any fraudulent conveyance
that might otherwise affect their lien.

Therefore, Baldwins took

the property subject to Burtons' lien, and Burtons were entitled
to execute upon the property.

The applicable limitations period

for such execution was not UCA 78-12-26(3), but the eight-year
period established by UCA 78-22-1.

As stated in 37 Am.Jur.2d,

Fraudulent Conveyances, Section 193:
The statute of limitations does not have the
effect of converting a fraudulent deed into a valid
deed by reason of the lapse of the prescribed time? it
simply forbids the right of action for relief on the
ground of fraud. Hence, if the question as to the
fraudulent character of the deed arises in any way
other than in such an action, there is nothing in the
statute which forbids its being assailed for fraud.
Thus, one who has made out a prima facie case for the
recovery of land is not prevented from attacking as
fraudulent a deed which is set up in defense, because
the time for bringing an action to set aside the
conveyance as fraudulent has expired. And the remedy
of foreclosure by a creditor who has obtained a
judgment that a conveyance is fraudulent may be pursued
by the creditor even when his equitable action to set
aside a conveyance has been barred by the statute of
limitations.
A suit to remove a cloud on the title to property
caused by a fraudulent conveyance thereof is not one
for relief on the ground of fraud; and it is therefore
not subject to the limitation imposed by statute on
such a suit. An action at law by the execution
purchaser to test the validity of his title is not
necessarily barred because the judgment creditor has
lost, by lapse of time, his equitable remedy to set
aside the fraudulent conveyance.
In the case of Aberdeen Federal Sav. & Loan v. Hanson, 794
P.2d 1322 (Wash. App. 1990), the plaintiff sought to garnish
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property

in 1987 which had allegedly been

transferred in 1984.

fraudulently

In response to the defendant's limitation

defense, the plaintiff argued that limitations was not governed
by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud, but by the
ten-year limitations period applicable to judgments.
court accepted this argument.

The trial

However, the Washington Court of

Appeals disagreed, holding at page 1324:
Aberdeen Federal argues that the ten-year period
of RCW 4.16.02 0 should apply because this action is
primarily an effort to collect on a judgment. The
gravamen of the claim determines the applicable statute
of limitation. The three-year limitation of RCW
4.16.080(4) applies to fraudulent conveyance actions.
Aberdeen Federal seeks two distinct types of
relief. First, it seeks to set aside the fraudulent
conveyance. Second, it seeks to execute on the
property to satisfy its judgment. In this step of the
proceedings the gravamen of the claim is an action to
set aside a purported fraudulent conveyance. Thus, the
three-year statute of limitations applies. (Citations
omitted.)
The Washington Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the
trial court's decision because the fraud was first discovered
within the three-year period.

Id. at 1325.

Aberdeen Federal Sav. & Loan illustrates an important
distinction in the present case.

The "gravamen" of the present

case is merely an execution action.

Burtons have not requested

that any fraudulent conveyance be set aside because such request
is unnecessary, inasmuch as Burtons' judgment lien is of record.
It makes no difference to Burton whether Mr. Wood's Deed to
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Mrs. Wood was fraudulent,
unrecorded
fraudulent

or non-delivered,

r e c o n v e y a n c e by M r s . Wood,
conveyance i s s u e was f i r s t

or superseded by an
or whatever.

The

r a i s e d by Baldwins as a

defense t o Burtons' execution.
There i s a t l e a s t an issue of fact in t h i s case as t o when
Burtons

should have d i s c o v e r e d

Mr. Wood's

conveyances.

the

Burtons

fraudulent

submit

that,

nature

of

under

the

a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e , they were not required t o b r i n g an a c t i o n t o
s e t a s i d e such c o n v e y a n c e s , which p r i o r t o the f i l i n g of
p r e s e n t a c t i o n , would have seemed s u p e r f l u o u s .

the

B u r t o n s were

j u s t i f i e d in d i s r e g a r d i n g the a l l e g e d fraudulent conveyances and
the imponderable mess of Woods' and Baldwins' d e a l i n g s with the
p r o p e r t y , and execute upon t h e i r l i e n .
POINT I I I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN RULING THAT BALDWIN WAS A
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY
Baldwin argued throughout the District Court proceeding that
she was a bona fide purchaser of the Lauri Kay property and, as
such, took the property free from Burtons' judgment lien.
District Court implicitly accepted
Memorandum Decision (R. 576-577).

this argument

The

in its

However, Burtons submit that

Baldwin was not a bona fide purchaser as a matter of law, or, in
the alternative, that the evidence presented to the District
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Court created a material issue of fact as to Baldwin's bona fide
purchaser status.
In order to claim bona fide purchaser status, a purchaser
must provide valuable consideration,^ and must obtain its
interest in the property in good faith.
P.2d 644, 653 (Utah 1954) .

Pender v. Dowse, 265

A purchase is not made with good

faith if it is made with notice of a prior adverse interest in
the property.
constructive.

I_d.

Such notice may be either actual or

Constructive notice occurs "when circumstances

arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to
require further inquiry on his part."

Meyer General American

Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 1977).

As a general rule, the

docketing of a judgment operates as constructive notice of the
existence thereof.

77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, Section

664.
b

I n the present case, the property was listed for
$265,000.00 at the time that Baldwins commenced negotions with
Woods for the purchase of the property. According to
Mr. Baldwin, "Willard Wood mentioned he was under some financial
duress, and was willing to take a lower price on the home."
(Baldwin Depo., page 5.) As consideration for the property,
Baldwins paid Woods $57,024.33, assumed a first mortgage to
Equitable Life Insurance Company in the amount of $25,780.00, and
assumed the Woods1 obligation to Kofoeds under the May 15, 1979
Uniform Real Estate Contract, in the amount of $121,695.67, for
a total purchase price of $204,500.00. (R. 153; Wood Depo., page
22.) While Mr. Baldwin considered this to be a "very good deal"
(Baldwin Depo., page 21), it does not appear to be grossly
inadequate consideration. However, considering that Burton's
judgment against Mr. Wood is only in the amount of $4,323.73
(R. 240), Baldwins1 purchase price may or may not reflect a
discount for the Burton judgment.
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Utah Code Annotated Section 78-22-1 states:
From the time the judgment of the district court
or circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of
the clerk of the district court of the county it
becomes a lien upon all the real property of the
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the
county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him
at the time or by him thereafter acquired during the
existence of said lien. A transcript of judgment
rendered in a district court or circuit court of this
state, in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed
in the office of the clerk of the district court of any
other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same
force and effect as a judgment entered in the district
court in such county. The lien shall continue for
eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied
or unless the enforcement of the judgment is stayed on
appeal by the execution of a sufficient undertaking as
provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment
ceases.
Under this section, a judgment automatically becomes a lien
upon all non-exempt real property of the judgment debtor at the
time it is docketed, and the judgment creditor's right to such
lien is unconditional and is not subject to alteration by a court
on

equitable

grounds.

Taylor

Nat11,

Inc. v. Jensen

Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah 1982).

The statute

contains no exception for bona fide purchasers, nor is such an
exception necessary, because judgment indexes afford ready access
to information regarding judgment liens to prospective purchasers
of real property, and purchasers who fail to inspect
records do so at their own peril.
Judgments, Sections 155, 160.
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such

See generally 46 Am.Jur.2d,

Even if the docketing of Burton's judgment did not in itself
create constructive notice of Burton's judgment lien, substantial
evidence was presented to the District Court that Baldwins had
cictual notice of Burton's judgment lien at the time they
purchased the property.

First and foremost, it appears that

Baldwin's title agent, Western States, had actual knowledge of
the Burton lien at the time that it issued its title report to
Baldwins, but omitted any reference to the lien within its Title
Report for reasons that its agents do not recall.

(R. 089-091,

110, 138.)
It is well settled that a principal is chargeable with and
bound by notice which her agent receives while the agent is
acting within the scope of his authority, and which is in
reference to a matter over which his authority extends.

77

Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, 654. Western States' failure to
discover or disclose Burton's judgment lien might give rise to a
cause of action by Baldwins against Western States,7 but it is no
defense to Burton's lien.
Evidence was also presented to the District Court that
Baldwins personally had at least constructive notice of the
fraudulent nature of their September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed from
Woods.

First, inasmuch as the May 1, 1980 Special Warranty Deed

^See e.g., Kiniskie v. Archway Motel, Inc., 586 P.2d 502
(Wash. App. 1969).
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from M r . Wood

to Mrs. Wood was of record, Baldwins

had

constructive knowledge of that instrument, including

its

recitation of "other good and valuable consideration" and had the
same obligation as Burtons (if any) to inquire as to the reason
for the conveyance and the nature of the consideration.

In fact,

Baldwins have stated that the reason for Mr. Wood's signing of
the September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed was that Mr. Wood appeared
to have "some naked interest of record" in the property by virtue
of his having signed the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed to
Kofoeds.

(R. 410, 413.)

Further, Mr. Wood has stated that his

reason for signing the Warranty Deed to Baldwins was that he
thought he still had an interest in the property, notwithstanding
his prior conveyance to Mrs. Wood.

(R. 071.)

Therefore, it

appears that Baldwins were aware of the conveyance from Mr. Wood
to Mrs. Wood at the time of their purchase, and of the fact that
there was some question as to the validity of that conveyance.
Baldwins were expressly notified by Mr. Wood that he was
experiencing financial difficulties at the time of the purchase.
(Baldwin Depo., page 5.)

There is also a question as to the

reason for Woods1 execution of the September 30, 19 81 Trust Deed
to Kofoeds, since Woods presumably had no interest in the
property after executing their Warranty Deed to Baldwins.
Finally, even if Baldwins were bona fide purchasers at the
time of their initial purchase of the property, they have
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subsequently l o s t

that status.

Baldwins

i n t e r e s t under the

September 3 0, 1981 Warranty Deed from Wo^d was

extinguished

through foreclosure of Kofoed's September 30, 1981 Trust Deed on
June 10, 1987 (R. 3 6 8 ) .

T i t l e to the property was subsequently

r e t u r n e d t o Baldwin by Q u i t - C l a i m Deed d a t e d June 22, 1988.
(R. 380.)

Baldwin received such property by way of a g i f t

Mr. B a l d w i n ' s employer

(Baldwin Depo., pages 28-30).

knew of B u r t o n ' s

at

the

time

that

Baldwin

she r e c e i v e d

the

Q u i t - C l a i m Deed, and a l s o p r o v i d e d no c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r

the

Deed.

lien

from

Therefore, she had no claim t o bona ^ide purchaser s t a t u s

a t t h e time t h a t
Decision.8

the D i s t r i c t

Court e n t e r e d

its

The i n t e r e s t which Baldwins a s s e r t

Memorandum

in t h i s

case

i s not the i n t e r e s t which they received pursuant to the September
30,

19 81 Warranty Deed from Woods, but the i n t e r e s t of Kofoeds

within t h e i r September 30, 1981 Trust Deed from Woods (R. 235) .
^Baldwins commenced t h i s action on May 12, 1987, a t which
time Badwins' claimed i n t e r e s t w i t h i n t h e p r o p e r t y was under
t h e i r S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 1 W a r r a n t y Deed from W o o d s .
( I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the o r i g i n a l Complaint f i l e d by Baldwins named as
P l a i n t i f f s "Linda Baldwin and Gregory Blake Baldwin," even though
Mr. Baldwin purported to convey a l l of h i s i n t e r e s t w i t h i n t h e
property to Mrs. Baldwin by Quit-Claim Deed on December 21, 1982
(R. 340) . That i n t e r e s t of t h e B a l d w i n ? was s u b s e q u e n t l y
f o r e c l o s e d on J u n e 1 0 , 1 9 8 7 , a s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e t e x t .
Therefore, Baldwins' i n t e r e s t in the property as of the date of
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Memorandum D e c i s i o n was l i m i t e d to t h a t
which had b e e n r e c o n v e y e d t o M r s . B a l d w i n and t h e Lynda
C. B a l d w i n T r u s t on O c t o b e r 7 , 1987 a*nd J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 8 8 ,
respectively.
The named P l a i n t i f f w i t h i n B a l d w i n ' s Amended
Complaint dated January 3, 1989 i s "Lynda C. Baldwin . . . in her
name on behalf of the Lynda Baldwin T r u s t . "
[sic]
-
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There is no evidence in the record as to what, if any, knowledge
Kofoeds had, or of any inquiry which Kofoeds made, concerning
Burton's j udgment 1ien.
POINT IV
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING BALDWINS ATTORNEY'S FEES AS DAMAGES
The sole item of damages which was awarded to Baldwins by
the District Court consisted of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred
Seventy-two and 66/100 Dollars ($7,827.66) "representing payment
for attorney's fees and related damages incurred by plaintiff in
this matter . . • ."

(R. 668.)

The District Court did not

indicate the legal basis for its award of Baldwin's attorney's
fees within either its Judgment or within its May 25, 1989
Memorandum Decision.

The sole basis alleged within Baldwin's

Amended Complaint for an award of attorney's fees was under Utah
Code Annotated
defense.

Section 78-27-56 for a bad faith action or

Therefore, it is conceivable that the District Court's

award of attorney's fees was (a) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-27-56; (b) for slander of title; or (c) for wrongful
execution.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56(1) allows a prevailing
party reasonable attorney's fees only where the Court determines
that the action or defense "was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith . . . ."

Recovery under the statute

requires both that the action or defense be without merit, and
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brought in subjective bad faith.

Canyon Country Store v. Bracey,

781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989); Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1983).
case.

Neither of these elements exist in the present

The argument herein demonstrates that this case poses

several complex legal and factual issues, the merits of which
cannot be easily determined.

Regarding burton's subjective

intent, there is absolutely no evidence in the record of any
malice or unprofessional conduct on the part of Burtons toward
Baldwins,

Burton's execution upon the property was induced by

Burton Sr.'s receipt of a Notice of Default on the Lauri Kay
property during the spring of 1986, which indicated

that

Baldwin's interest in the property was about to be foreclosed
upon.

(R. 047.)

Burton, Sr. subsequently obtained a foreclosure

report, dated May 8, 1986, which indicated that Burton's judgment
lien had attached to the property prior to Kofoeds1 September 30,
1981 Trust Deed.

Burtons then proceeded to execute upon the

property, as would

any

reasonable

creditor

under

the

circumstances.
In Utah, for one to be liable for slander of title, he must
publish matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's
interest in property.
1954) .

Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 664 (Utah

In the present case, Burtons did not publish anything

that was untrue:

They had a judgment against Mr. Wood which was

apparently attached to the property at the time of Woods'
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conveyance to Baldwins.

Baldwins were clearly "successors-

in-interest" to Woods, whether or not Baldwins were bona fide
purchasers or the conveyance from Woods was fraudulent.

Although

Pender v. Dowse implies that attorney's fees may at times be
appropriate, in slander of title actions (Cf. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel
and Slander, Section 550), the present case involves no facts
which would warrant an assessment of attorney's fees against
Burtons on such theory.
Attorney's fees have sometimes been awarded as damages in
cases involving wrongful executions.

Coggins v Wright, 526 P.2d

741 (Ariz. App. 1974); 30 Am.Jur.2d, Executions, Section 763.
However, such damages are generally allowed only when the party
performing the execution has acted in bad faith.

Peterson

v. Montana Bank of Bozeman, 657 P.2d 673, 681 (Mont. 1984).
Accordingly, a party is not liable for a wrongful execution where
the execution is caused by the misconduct of another person, such
as the execution officer, Foley v. Audit Services, Inc., 693 P.2d
528, 531 (Mont. 1985), or where the execution results from an
erroneously entered judgment, Schuman v. Wallace, 104 P.2d 432
(Okl. 1940).
In the present case, there is no evidence of bad faith on
the part of Burtons.

Any error in the execution was caused, not

by Burtons, but by Woods' and Baldwins' conduct in acting as
through Mr. Wood had an interest in the property.
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Baldwin should not have been awarded damages against Burtons
for the additional reason that Burton's execution upon the
property caused no damage to Baldwin.

At the time of Burton's

execution, the assignee of the Kofoed Trust Deed had already
issued a Notice of Default upon the property and the property was
subsequently foreclosed upon through a Trustee's Sale on June 10,
1987.

Therefore, at the time of Burton's execution, Baldwins

were in default, and were about to lose their interest in the
property in any event.

Baldwins have subsequently regained an

interest in the property and have asserted that interest as the
successor-in-interest to the Kofoed1s Trust Deed.

However,

Kofoeds were not the owners of the property at the time of
Burton's execution, and any conflict between the interests of
Burtons and Kofoeds (now Baldwin) constitutes a conflict as to
lien priority, not a wrongful execution.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN AWARDING BALDWIN'S PARALEGAL COSTS
Burton's argued within the preceding Point IV hereof that
the District Court should not have awarded Baldwin's attorney's
fees in this case.

However, even if Baldwin was entitled to her

attorney's fees, the District Court erred in awarding Baldwin
over Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) in "paralegal costs."
The Affidavit of attorney's fees, which was filed by
Baldwin's attorney in the District Court set forth, inter alia,
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t h e amount of Three Thousand One Hundred N i n e t y - t w o

Dollars

($3,192 •00)

Dollars

($245.00)

in a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s ,
in

"secretarial

f e e s " and Nine Thousand One Hundred

N i n e t y - f i v e and 19/100 D o l l a r s
(R. 6 4 3 . )

Two Hundred F o r t y - f i v e

($9,195.19)

Attached to said Affidavit

in " p a r a l e g a l
is

a fifteen

costs."

(15) page

b i l l i n g statement from "Paul H. Richins & Company I n c . , "
purports

to

itemize

the

said

N i n e t y - f i v e and 19/100 D o l l a r s

Nine

Thousand

($9,195.19)

One

in p a r a l e g a l

which

Hundred
costs.

(R. 644-658.)
Burton filed a timely objection to Baldwin's proposed
attorney's fees and costs (R. 659-662) in which Burtons argued,
inter alia, that Baldwin's claims for "secretarial fees" and
"paralegal costs" were not recoverable under Utah law.
The District Court held a hearing upon Baldwin's proposed
attorney's fees and costs on May 14, 1990. The District Court
subsequently issued its Judgment, dated June 4, 1990, which
awarded Baldwin a total of Seven Thousand Eight

Hundred

Seventy-two and 66/100 Dollars ($7,872.66) in attorney's fees and
"related damages."

(R. 668.) Although the District Court did

not specify the portion of its award which related to secretarial
fees and paralegal costs, inasmuch as the total amount of
attorney's fees and undisputed costs claimed by Baldwins amounted
to only Three Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-five and 06/100
Dollars

($3,275.06), the balance of Four Thousand Five Hundred
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N i n e t y - s e v e n and 60/100 D o l l a r s

($4 r 597.60)

must have been

awarded for s e c r e t a r i a l fees and/or p a r a l e g a l c o s t s .
The Utah Supreme Court has not s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed the
i s s u e of whether or to what e x t e n t s e c r e t a r i a l
expenses are r e c o v e r a b l e .
on t h i s i s s u e .
not

( F l a . App. 1987)?
(N.J. Super. 1986) .

equipped

compensation.

Lemoine
In

re

v.

Trust

Cooney,
of

414

Brown,

S.2d

517 A.2d

The r e a s o n i n g in t h e s e d e c i s i o n s

is

are
391
893
that

" a r e a n e c e s s a r y p a r t or adjunct of a properly

lawyer's

attorney's

Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s are much divided

Some c o u r t s have h e l d t h a t such expenses

recoverable.

such expenses

and p a r a l e g a l

hourly

office,"
fee,

which a r e

and a r e n o t

included within

entitled

to

an

separate

Levy v . S t a t e , 420 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1979).

Conversely, several Courts have held t h a t such expenses are
recoverable.

Lea Co. v . North C a r o l i n a Bd. of T r a n s p . ,

374

S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1989); Multi-moto v . ITT Commercial Finance, 806
S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App. 1991); Aires v . Palmer Johnson, I n c . , 735
P.2d 1373 (Ariz. App. 1987); Newport v . Newport, 759 S.W.2d 630
(Mo. App. 1988).^

The r a t i o n a l e behind these cases i s t h a t the

^In A l a s k a , p a r a l e g a l fees are recoverable as an item of
c o s t s , pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 7 9 ( b ) . Paralegal fees a r e
r o u t i n e l y allowed by the Federal Courts in claims brought under
federal s t a t u t e s which provide for an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
Hawkins v . A n h e u s e r - B u s c h , 697 F . 2 d 810 ( 8 t h C i r . 1983);
S e b a s t i a n v . Texas D e p t . of C o r r e c t i o n s , 558 F . S u p p . 507
(Dist. Tex. 1983).
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use of paralegals may result in savings to clients and lower
overall fee awards.

Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp.,

374 S.E.2d at 871.
Utah has traditionally adhered to a strict application of
the "American Ruler" whereby parties are required to bear their
own legal expenses unless an award of attorney's fees or costs is
expressly allowed by statute or contract.

Dyson v. Aviation

Office, 593 P.2d 143 (Ut. 1979); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834
(Ut. 1989) .

Any benefit in reduced legal expenses which can be

achieved through the use of paralegals is not dependent upon the
recoverability of such expenses from the opposing party.

In

fact, as the present case demonstrates, allowing recovery of
paralegal fees may increase the costs of litigation and the
amount of attorney's fee awards.
Even if the Court should determine that paralegal fees are
recoverable in some instances, the paralegal fees claimed by
Plaintiff in the present case should be disallowed.

The Courts

which have allowed recovery of paralegal fees have uniformly
allowed such fees as an adjunct of attorney's fees, rather than
as an item of costs.

This distinction is not merely semantic:

Treating paralegal expenses as an item of attorney's fees insures
that such expenses are related

to legal services and are

performed under the auspices of an attorney.

As the Court stated

in Multi-moto v. ITT Commercial Finance, 806 S.W.2d at 570:
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A party may separately assess and include in the
award of attorney's fees compensation for a legal
assistant if that assistant performs work traditionally
done by an attorney. In order to recover such amounts,
the evidence must establish: (1) the qualifications of
the legal assistant to perform substantive legal work;
(2) that the legal assistant performed substantive
legal work under the direction and supervision of an
attorney; (3) the nature of the legal work performed;
(4) the legal assistant's hourly rate; and (5) the
number of hours expended by the legal assistant.
(Citations deleted.)
In the present case, not only have the factors referred to
in Multi-moto not been set forth, it positively appears from the
record that Mr. Richins largely operated outside of the control
of Baldwin's attorney, prepared an independent billing statement
according to Mr. Richins' own methods and disbursed his own
costs.

Allowing paralegal costs in the present case would

encourage paralegals to act outside of the direction or control
of a licensed attorney, in potential violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 78-51-25.
POINT VI
BURTON'S LIEN WAS NOT
AFFECTED BY WOODS' DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY
Baldwins argued at length in the District Court

that

Burton's judgment lien was rendered void by Woods' discharge in
bankruptcy on December 15, 1983.

(R. 474-475, 509-512.)

Although the District Court mentioned Woods' bankruptcy in its
May 25, 1989 Memorandum Decision (R. 577), the District Court
made no express determination of the issue.
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11 U.S.C. Section 524 states in part:
(a)

A discharge in a case under this title -

(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to
the extent that such judgment is a determination of the
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any
debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228 or
13 2 8 of this title, whether or not discharge of such
debt is waived;
This section expressly voids judgments only to the extent
that they involve "the personal liability of the debtor."

In the

present case, Burton's judgment lien was upon the property, which
passed to Baldwins upon Wood's execution of the September 30,
1981 Warranty Deed.

After that time, Burton's lien was never an

obligation of Woods, personal or otherwise.

Burton's execution

upon the property had no effect whatsoever upon Woods.
11 U.S.C. Section 506(d) states:
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against
the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such
lien is void unless (1) such claim was disallowed only under section
502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due
only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of
such claim under section 501 of this title.
This provision expressly excludes from discharge liens which
have not been made a part of the bankruptcy proceeding, either by
the filing of a proof of claim or by being made an
secured claim.

allowed

The legislative history of Section 506(d) states:

Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the
bankruptcy case unaffected.
However, if a party in
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interest requests the court to determine and allow or
disallow the claim secured by the lien under section
502 and the claim is not allowed, then the lien is void
to the extent that the claim is not allowed. The
voiding provision does not apply to claims disallowed
only under section 502(e), which requires disallowance
of certain claims against the debtor by a codebtor,
s u r e t y , , or g u a r a n t o r for c o n t r i b u t i o n or
reimbursement.
[House Report 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977);
cf. Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 68
(1978) .]
In Matter of Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1984), a secured
creditor filed its proof of claim two

(2) months after the

deadline for filing claims had elapsed.

The bankruptcy judge

disallowed the claim because it was late, and further declared
that the plaintiff's lien was extinguished.

The Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the bankruptcy judge,
to the extent that it invalidated the plaintiff's lien.

In so

doing, the Court stated:
A long line of cases . . . allows a creditor with
a loan secured by a lien on the assets of a debtor who
becomes bankrupt before the loan is repaid to ignore
the bankruptcy proceeding and look to the lien for the
satisfaction of the debt. (Citations deleted.)
One of the "long line of cases" cited in Matter of Tarnow is
De Laney v. City and County of Denver, 185 F.2d 246
Cir. 1950).

(10th

In that case, the City of Denver, Colorado possessed

tax liens upon certain personal property of the debtor, which
personal property passed

into the hands of a trustee in

bankruptcy and was sold by him free of the liens.
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The City did

not file a notice of its tax liens and did not file a claim for
taxes.

However, following the sale of the personal property, the

City filed a petition which asserted its liens against the
proceeds from the sale of the personal property.

In holding that

the City was entitled to such proceeds, the Court stated at page
251:
A lien claimant may pursue one of three courses,
(1) he may prove his claim as an unsecured claim and
surrender his security; (2) he may prove his claim as a
secured claim, give credit thereon for the value of the
security, and share in the general assets as to the
unsecured balance? or (3) he may not file a claim at
all and rely solely upon his lien.
Delaney merely confirms the rule which is expressed in
Sections 524 and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, that liens which
are not made a part of the bankruptcy proceeding
discharged.

are not

Application of this rule is particularly proper in

the present case where Woods did not claim the property and had
no apparent

interest

in the property at the time of the

bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument,
Burtons pray that this Honorable Court reverse the decision of
the District Court and Order that Burtons' Sheriff Deed be
reinstated.

In the alternative, should the Court determine that

genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary
judgment for either party at this time, Burtons request that this
case be remanded to the District Court for trial.
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DATED this

day of November, 1991.
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

DAVID H. SCHWOBE, Attorney f o ^
Defendants/Appellants Burton

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Paul H. Richins, Pro Se, Substitute Appellee, 68 South Main, 8th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this
1991.

David H. Schwobe
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LYNDA C. BALDWIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO.

C-87-2971

:

WILLARD D. WOOD, et al.,

:

Defendant.

Plaintiff's

:

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on May 23, 1989.
Both parties filed extensive Memoranda and Reply Memoranda of
Points and Authorities which the Court reviewed prior to the
hearing.

Upon hearing argument the Court took the matter under

advisement.

The Court has now reviewed the argument of counsel,

the points and authorities submitted by both parties, and herein
renders its decision.
On December

19, 1979, Kofoeds

conveyed

the property

question by warranty deed to Willard and Tonya Wood.

in

On May 1,

1980, Willard Wood conveyed to Tonya Wood by warranty deed his
interest in the property.

On June 9, 1981, defendant Burton

obtained a Judgment against Willard Wood and one other.
September

On

30, 1981, Tonya Wood conveyed by warranty deed to

Gregory and Lynda Baldwin the said property.

(This warranty deed

BALDWIN V. WOOD
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was also signed by Willard Wood.)

Also on September 30, 1981,

Tonya Wood conveyed a trust deed to Kofoeds.
was also signed by Willard Wood)•

(This trust deed

The Baldwins in purchasing

the said property took the same subject to the primary mortgage
with Equitable Life Assurance Company, and the aforementioned
trust deed.
Therefore, as of September

30, 1981, the Baldwins were

owners of the property, subject to the underlying mortgage, the
trust deed, and any liens of record.

There were no liens of

record against Tonya Wood, but there was the Burton Judgment lien
of record against Willard Wood.
The fact that Willard Wood also signed the warranty deed to
Baldwins does not affect the title of the property",^ and is
• insufficient to put Baldwins on notice to inquire further as to
Willard Wood

since Tonya^WoodT&was the only titled

owner of

record.'
It is Burton's claim that the conveyance from Willard Wood
to Tonya Wood was a fraudulent conveyance to defraud creditors,
and therefore, nyll and void, and that his lien against the said
property was valid.
Baldwins

claim

that

they

were

bona

fide

purchasers,

purchasing the property from the only owner of record, Tonya
Wood, and having no knowledge of the Judgment lien against

BALDWIN V. WOOD
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Willard Wood, therefore even if the conveyance was fraudulent, it
doesn't affect their interest.
Burton claims Baldwins had actual notice of his Judgment
against

Willard

retained,

Wood

because

the

title

company,

which

they

had actual notice of the same.

On April 21, 1983, ^Willard Wood filed for bankruptcy, and
listed

Burton

as

a

Judgment

creditor.

subsequently discharged in bankruptcy.

Willard

Wood

was

Burton maintains that his

lien continued against the said property in spite of the said
discharge.
On August

6, 1986, Burton obtained

a Writ of Execution

ordering the sheriff or constable of Salt Lake County to collect
his Judgment against Burton by levying upon and selling enough of
the unexempted real estate of Willard D. Wood to satisfy the
Judgment.

At or near the same time, the Burtons delivered to the

sheriff of Salt Lake County a praecipe- directing the sheriff to
"levy on the right, title and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin
and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard D. Wood."
-Notice of Real Estate

Levy was recorded

on August

A

12, 1986

indicating that the sheriff on August 11, 1986 had levied upon
all the right, title, claim and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin
and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard Wood.

A

subsequent Notice of Sheriff's Sale indicated that all rights,
title and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin,
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successors

in

interest

September 9, 1986.

of

Willard
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D.

Wood,

to

be

sold

on

Proof of publication indicates notice of the

real estate sale, again indicating the sale of the interest of
Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest
of Willard D. Wood.

The property sold for $8,760.10 to Burtons.

The Certificate^of Sale at execution, dated September 12, 1986,
indicates a verification that the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Department under the Execution issued out of the court sold the
said property for $8,7 60.10, which was the highest bid made on
the interest of "said defendants,11 and further added "all right,
title and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin,
successors in interest of Willard D. Wood."

The caption on this

document indicates the parties to the lawsuit to be Max D. Burton
and Emily A. Burton v. Clealon Mann and Willard D. Wood.

The

document indicates the Judgment was entered on June 9, 1981, the
Execution issued August 6, 198 6, the property sold September 9,
1986, and the civil number to be C-81-1568.

The Baldwins were

not parties to that action, and do not so appear as parties ir
this certificate.
Burtons only lien rights in this matter were against the
interest in real estate owned bv his Judgment debtor, Willard
Wood.

Burton had no riaht tc the interest in real estate owned

by the-Baldwins; and could not proceed against their rights.
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If Burton believed that the Willard Wood conveyance to Tonya
Wood was a fraudulent conveyance, made to defraud creditors, then
he should have filed an action to have the said conveyance set
aside so that his lien rights could be perfected.
action, he would

have

named

the Woods

and

In such

the Baldwins

as

defendants, which would have given the Baldwins the right to
litigate this issue, and.have their due process rights protected.
However, such was never done.
the

Baldwins

and

was

Title has remained at all times ini.

in th^

Baldwins

at

the

time

Burton

proceeded against the said property.
This Court holds that the sheriff's sale was - void;
Baldwins were never Judgment debtors of Burton.
a

legal

right to the

interests

of the

The

Burton never had

Baldwins.

The only

interest Burton had pursuant to his lien was a right to Willard
Wood's

owned

Execution

interest

in

appears to be

any

real

property.

correct on its face.

The

Writ

of

However, the

Praecipe was ^in.error, as were all subsequent documents leading
up to the sale of the property.
Baldwins1

property

by

In essence, Burton has obtained

improperly

prepared

violation of the rights of Baldwin.

documents, all

in

Therefore, the sheriff's

deed is herein declared null and void, and set aside.
Burton attempts to obliquely attack the Baldwins' interest
in this real property by alleging that Baldwins were, in some
manner, the successors in interest to Willard Wood.

There^isTno
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factual evidence whatsoever to remotely suggest the Baldwins are
successors

in*- interest

to

Willard

Wood,

subjecting

them

to

liability on the Judgment Burton has against Willard Wood.
Since the title of the property was and is clearly in Lynda
Baldwin, the question remains whether or not Burton still has a,
lien

against

the propertv

Burton's

lien

is only to that

property owned by Willard Wood, but Willard Wood conveyed the
property to Tonya Wood on May 1, 1980, and Tonya Wood conveyed
the property to the Baldwins on September 30, 1981.

No* action

has been filed to set that conveyance aside, and the *Burtons have*
not so pled in this action

The statute of limitations has!<run

on bringing an action for fraudulent conveyance and, therefore,
the Court rules as a matter of law that Willard Wood ^has^no
ownership interest in the property in question, and has not had
such since conveying the same away in May of 198 0 and, therefore,
Burtom^'can^festablish

no riahts vto anv

interest

in the

said*

property^;
The fact that Lynda Baldwin took no action to redeem the
property
there.

after Burton's

foreclosure sale is neither here nor

Since the sale was void, there was nothing to redeem.

It is noted that Willard Wood filed for bankruptcy on April
21, 1983, and listed Burton as a Judgment creditor.
Issues

of

fact

remain

as

to

damages

Lynda

Baldwin

is

entitled1,tot&tincluding attorney's fees, in regards to her having

the^3bove^sheriff.»s

salej/and-,. sheriffs. deed„set_:jaside.

rhn«P

•issues will be preserved for trial
Based on the above, and for th* additional reasons as set
forth in the Memorandum

of Points and Authorities, and Reply

Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by the plaintiffs in
this matter, plaintiff «s |M35mrofS»^
asiito^decl'aring'^the-^sherff f,» s • sale^a^d^sffe^ffi^s'^de'ed^bs^urtb'n;.
to,ibe(inull'^andte,yoid^and^setiraside1?^Th,e1':td.ssue,; of damages remains

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Burton is denied
for the reasons stated above, and fojf the additional reasons set
forth in plaintiff's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum of Points
and Authorities filed in this matter.
The attorney for the plaintiffs will prepare the appropriate
Ordeir and Partial Summary Judgment.
Dated this

<^^

day of May, 1989.

ISri LeCmaurJL hJ--^)H5Sjr\
LEONARD H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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History

FORESTRY AND FfRE CONTROL
I* 1961, eta 63, § 2 0

Repealing Clause
Section 21 of Lavis 1961, eh 53 pro
* Med "Sections 24 1 1, 24 1 2, 24 1 3, 24 1
4, 2^1 5, 24 1 6 , 24 1 7, 24 1 8 , 24 1 9,
24 1 10 24 1 11, 24 1 12, 24 1 13, 24 1 14,
24 1 IS Utah Code Annotated 1053 are
herehv repeated "

Effective Date
Section 22 of Laws 1961, eh 53 pro
vidnd "This net shall take effect July 1,
1961 »

24 2 21 Violation of law, rule, regulation, or proclamation a misdemeanor—Any violation of any provisions of this chapter or of any rule,
regulation, or proclamation issued by the board of forestry and fire control
in consonance with this chapter shall be a misdemeanor
History 0 1963, 24 2 21, enacted b y I*.
1973, ch. 37, § 1
_,
Title of Act.
An act enacting section 24 2 21, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, making it a mis

TITLE 25

Collateral References
Woods and Forests*=»ll
98 C J 8 Woods and Forests $ 8

FRAUD
Fraudulent Conveyances, 2r> 1 1 to 2~> 1 16
Sale of Merchandise in Bulk 125 2 1 to 25 2 5 Repealed)
Leases and Sales of Livestock [25 3 1 to 25 3 4 Repealed]
Marketing Wool [25 4 1 to 25 4 3 Repealed]
Statute of Frauds, 25 5 1 to 25 5 9

Chapter 1
2
3
4
5

demeanor to violate any provision of the
state forestry and Are control law or any
of the rules, regulations, or proclamations
o f t n e b o a r d o f forestry and Are control —
Laws 1973, ch 37

CHAPTER 1
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Section 25 1
25 1
21 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1
25 1

1
2
1
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
11

25 M 4
25 1 15
25 1 16

Definitions
Insolvency
Fair consideration
Convexnnces hv insolvent
Convejances by persons in business.
Conveyances by persons about to incur debts
Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud creditors
When conveyance or assignment void
Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers—Fffect of notice at time
of purchase
( onveyanie of pnrtnership property
Trust for grantor void
"Creditors, "purchasers" includes heirs
Bona fide purchasers not affected
8nles without change of possession
Rights of creditors with matured claims
Rights of creditors with claims not matured

25-1-1. Definitions —In this chapter
"Assets" of a debtor means property not exempt from liability for Ins
debts To the extent that anv property is liable for any debt of the debtor
such property shall be included in Ins assets
"Conveyance" includes every payment of money, assignment, release,
transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and
also the creation of any lien or encumbrance
"Creditor" is a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent
"Debt" includes any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured,
liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent
History I* 1925, ch 42, § 1 , B B 1933
k O 1943, 33-1 1
Comparable Provisions
States that have adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act include A n
rona, California, Delaware, District of

840

Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, N e w Mexico,
N c w ^ o r J ( | North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsvhama, 8outh Dakota, Tennessee,
Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin
nnd V*coming
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25-1-1

FRAUDULENT LONVFYANCLS

FRAUD

Orosa Referenced
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor,
70 6 511
Fraudulent snie* by decedents, 76 11 13
Homesteads generally, Title 28
Statute of limitations, 7ft IS 26 (3)
Uniform Commercial Code—Bulk Trace
fere, 70A 6 101 et »eq
Uniform Commercial Code—Sales, 70A
2 lOt et eeq
Construction and application
This act has no application to fraudu
lent ennveyanceg occurring prior to its
passage
Smith v Edwards, 81 U 244,
17 P 2d 264
Creditors
Persons having claim in tort against
grnntor which wns not reduced to judg
incut nt time of alleged fraudulent con
vevnnce held 'creditor" within meaning
ot this section
Zumga r Evans, 87 U
108, 48 P 2d 513, 101 A L R 532, distln
guished in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
Exempt property
In action to set aside conveyance by
grnntor
to
daughters
as
fraudulent
grnntor was not entitled to homestead
exemption since he was not head of fam
ily where his wife had died and children
had nil attained majority and were not
dependent upon him
7unign v Evans,
87 U 1«>8, 48 P 2d 513, 101 A L R 532,
distinguished in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
If judgment debtor's interest in cer
tain land, which had been set aside to
him ai homestead by bankruptcy court,
wns greater in \ a l u o than at time of
debtor's convejnnce of land to his wife
without sufficient
consideration
which
rendered debtor insolvent, Utah district
court would be justified in setting pside
such convevnnce as frnud on creditors,
and judgment creditor thereupon could
have execution issued and land could be
sold in accordance with 28 1 14 and 28 1
lr> Ostler Lund A 1 ivestock Co v Brough,
111 U 116, 178 V 2d 911
In
determining
whether
judgment
debtor's interest in land, sot aside to bint
as homestead, had increased in value ao
as to be worth more than his homestead
exemption at time of debtor's conveyance
of such land to his wife without sufficient
consideration, so as to justify setting
aside of such conveyance as fraud on
creditors, trial court should have taken
into consideration effect of wife's one
third inchoate interest on market value
of such land, for failure of which judg
meat setting aside such conveyance was
reversed and remanded for new trial Ost
ler Land & Livestock Co v Brough, 111
U 336, 178 P 2d 911

Fraudulent mortgage
A creditor with a matured claim mm
have a mortgnge sot aside to the extent
necessary to satisfy his claim under 25 1
15 ( 1 ) where s m h eonvej anre was made
without fair consideration, defined in 25 1
3, and would render the person making it
insolvent Ned J Bowman Co v White,
13 U (2d) 173, 169 P 2d 962
Intent
In suit to set aside conveyance from
husband to wife, no actunl fraudulent
•n'ent *Ym be required, when there was
no fair value or consideration given, and
the effect of the transfer is to render
the grantor insolvent Cnrdon v Harper,
106 U 660, 151 T 2d 99, 154 A L R
906
Statute of limitations
In suit by United States to recover
taxes from taxpayer's transferee on theory
that transfer of tnxpayer« property had
been fraudulently made, government was
bound by six year federal statute of llmi
tntions rather than threo year Utah stat
ute of limitations on actions based upon
fraud or mistake, even though United
States was pursuing its common law rem
edv rather than its statutory remedy, rule
that United 8tates is not bound by state
statutes of limitation unless Congress so
provides was controlling
United States
\ Decker, 241 F Supp 283
Collateral References
Fraudulent Conveyances€=>5
37 C J S Fraudulent Conveyances § 5
37 Am Jur 2d 691, Fraudulent Convey
nnces § 1
Conflict of laws as regards validity of
fraudulent and preferential transfers and
assignments, 111 A L R 787
Creditors' right to attack as fraudulent
a convevancc by third person to debtor's
spouse, Ti A I R 2d 8
f u t u r e tort conveyance as fraudulent
where made in contemplation of possibility
for, 38 A L It Id 507
Gift or other voluntary transfer by
husband as fraud on wife, 64 A L R 466,
49 A L R 2d 521
Jurisdiction, and priority of its ex
ercise, to require real property in another
state or country to be applied in satis
faction of debt (including the setting
aside of a fraudulent conveyance thereof),
144 A L R 646
Right of creditors in respect of property
gratuitousl} c<pveyed or transferred to a
third person for alleged benefit of debtor,
147 \ I R 1160
Rights as between creditors of grnntor
or transferor and those of grantee or
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25 1 2

HMiirilx g i \ n in n nrw il o f , t t r h i i i g r or
HII t H( it lit ion for or nil I t t l o n t o , e x i s t i n g
M i i i n t v U 2 \ 1 It H«»7

ti in«»ft r« t III n »| i i I of | mpei ly «i»n\ i \« d
or tr iittfi rr< i| in frnud of creditors, 1 IK \
I It r»2«i
Right to Ml node, for btnrfit nf lit irs
nn I distributer*, n tonvcjnnro or transfer
bv dciedent in fraud of his creditors, 148
A I, it 210
Rule donving iclicf to one who con
v o i d his propertv to defraud his creditors
at ippluable where the threatened claim
which occ isioned the conveyance was paid
or wns n t \ e r est iblished, 21 A I H 2d
589
g»atnt» nr rnl«» relating to preferences
by insolvent debtor as applicable to now

htmrssioM, c s f a h , or gift tax in rcspoct
of or in nffictrd bv innvcvnnco or trnns
h r rt storing to original ownir property
transftired by him to defraud or dole)
creditors, 108 A L R 1508
Law Reviews
I he Bankrupt's Spouse The Forgotten
(huractir
in the Bankruptcy
Drama,
Iniiathnn M Landers, 1974 Utah L Rev
709, 722

25-1 2 I n s o l v e n c y — A person is insolvent when the piesent fair salable
\ a l u e of his assets is less than the amount that will bo icquired to satisfy
his probable liability on his existing debts i s t ! u \ become absolute and
matured
In determining whether a partnership is insolvent then shall be added
to the partnership propeitv the ptcscnt Ian salable value of the separate
assets of t a t h general partner in oxi ess of ihe amount piohahlj sufficient
to meet the tlaims of his s i p mite i n d i l o i s and also tin nmount of any
unpaid subscription to the pirtnership of int It limited p u t n e r , provided,
the present fair salable value of tin assets of such limited pnttner is probably sufficient to pay his debts, including su< h unpaid subscription
History L.. 1926, ch 42, § 2 , R 8 1933
& C 1943, 33 1 2.

Assignments

Cross Reference
\ s to setting n*ide friudulent or vol
mil ir) convpvinct s, stc 23 1 lr»
Allegation of Insolvency
Mlejption t h i t person is insolvent is
t l k g i t i o n of n conclusion, and such state
incut must t»e implificd by allegations of
fa» t as to nmouitl of monev required to
piv his probiblc existing liabilities as
they mature and of what fair salable
\ iliac his j r o p i r t y is, nnd that such
I ropcrtv IH iti«u0incnt to p i y his dtbls
WIIHII should It spmfitri
Smith v I d
u ml* 81 V 244 17 1 2 1 204, disij proved
in Zunigi v h i n s , S7 U l'»H, 48 I* 2d
5 H , 101 \ I
R 512, in which it was
i ml to be sufficient to allege, in addition
to mies«!irv m i t t i r s of inducement thnt
deft nd nit n u d e the convovance, tint he
V\T« thin insolvent or theicby rendered
insolvent and th it convev tnre w is made
without i nn«Mtl< r ition or without id( quite
considention
Mlegitton of insolvinrv in complaint
in i r t i o n to ^ct aside t o n v e j i i m e held
•sullicient i s a g i i n s t contention that it
w i s conclusion
7 u n i g i v Fvans 8< U
!*>« 48 P 2 1 513, 101 A L R 532, (lis
tinguished in 102 U 12, 120 P 2d 1063

Whether i n assignment of an interest
in mi estate was in good faith and not
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or
w is made for such purpose, depends
upon the facts and circumstances eur
M»IItiding tin
trans ictiou, as gathered
fiom the t n d g i s of fraud present
Boc
i ilero v Pee, 102 U 12, 1 G I 2d 10G1
Intent
In suit to set aside convevance from
husband to wife, no netu »1 fraudulent
intont will be required, when thoro wns
no fair vnluu or consider it ion givou, and
tho effect of tho trinsfer is to render
thn gruitor insolvent
( a n i o n v llnrper,
KM, U •",to, lr>l P 2d '»", lr>4 A Ti R
"06
Proof of Insolvency
Judgment and fruitless execution nro
conclusive evidence of judgment dobtor's
insolvent v Ogden State B i n k v Barker,
12 U 11 40 P 76% distinguished in 'it
U 481, 182 P 3r>7 nnd 102 U 12, 120
V 2d 1063
Collateral References
Fraudulent ConvevinrcsC=>')7<l)
37 C 1 S Frnuduhnt Coiiviyim ca $ 10G
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FRAUD

Right of ittsohcnt to insure life for
leneflt of rclntUes, 11 A 1/ R 51, 34 A
L U 838

Vnluiltnii of note* nnd accounts rc«eiv
iblo in determining question of insolvency
or bankruptcy, 133 A L U 1274

26 1 3 Fair consideration —Fair consideration is given for property, or
obligation
(1) When in exchange for snch property, or obligation, as a fair
equivalent therefor, and m good faith, property is con\eycd or an ante
cedent debt is satisfied , or,
(2) When such property, or obligation, is received in good faith to
secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not dispropor
tionately small when compared with the value of the property or obligation obtained
History I* 1025, ch 42, § 3 , R 8 1933
* 0 1043, 33-1 3
Evidence
Consideration clause in deed does not
prove that deed was founded on valuable
consideration, or on any consideration,
ind hence where consideration expressed
is one dollar, it may be shown that larger
num nrtunlh was paid, and, where larger
sum is expressed it may be shown that
lesHer sum actually was paid Ogden State
Rink v barker, 12 U 13 40 P 765, distin
guished in 54 U 481 182 P 357 and 102
U 12 126 P 2d 1063
Fact that grnntor wns permitted to
introduce evidence, tending to show that
his deed to his sons was made because
grantees had remained at home with him,
had rendered value in work to him, and
had agreed to stay with him, could not
change effect and operation of only con
sideration expressed in deed, namely ono
dollar Ogden Bhite Bank v Barker, 12 IT
H 40 V 76r», distinguished in 54 U 481,
182 P 317 and 10" U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
Consideration entirely different from
that expressed in deed cannot be shown
bj parol evidence Ogden Btnte Bank v
Barker, 12 U 13 40 P 765, distinguished
in 54 U 481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12,
126 P 2d 1063
Kecited consideration of $10 in deed
from father to daughters wns not fair
(onsiderntiou and expression "other good
nnd %iluihle consideration" held to mean
nothing in absence of extrinsic explana
tory evidence Zuniga v Evans, 87 U 108,
48 P 2d 513 101 A L R 532, distin
guished in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
Whether an assignment of an interest
in an estate was in good faith and not to
hin ler, delay or defraud creditors, or
w as made for such purpose, depends upon
the facta nnd circumstances surrounding
the transaction, as gathered from the
badges of fraud present Boccalero v Bee,
102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063

' Fair equivalent"
"Fair equivalent" used in this section
means something other than "exact equiv
nlcnt" or "full value," since "fair" modi
fies nnd restricts "equivalent " Utah As
sets Corp v Dooley Bros A s s n , 02 U
r
»77, 70 P 2d 738
Fraudulent intent
In suit to set aside conveyance from
husband to wife, no actual fraudulent
intent will be required, when there was
no fair value or consideration given
and the effect of the transfer is to render
the grantor insolvent Cardon v Harper,
106 U 560, 151 P 2d 09, 154
A L B
006
Fraudulent mortgage
A creditor with a matured claim may
have a mortgage, a conveyance under
L"i 1 1, set nside to the extent necessary to
satisfy his claim under 25 1 15 (1) where
such con\o}nnce was made without con
siderntion and would render the person
making it insolvent Ned J B o * man Co
v White, 13 U (2d) 173, 360 P 2d 062
Parent and child
Labor performed for parents by chil
dren during their minority will not en
title such children to compensation, so
as to establish relation of debtor and
creditor nnd permit parents lawfully to
prefer children, convey their property to
them, nnd thus plaee property out of
reach of parents' creditors whose claims
were in existence at time of deed's exe
cution Ogden State Bank v Barker, 12
U 13, 40 P 765, distinguished in 54 U
481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d
1063
Valuable consideration
Where any promise or agreement of
grantee sons to stay with grantor father
was made at time when grantor was
legally entitled to grantees' services with
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out compensation su« h services would not
constitute talunble consideration which
would avail grantees as against grantor's
creditors whose claims wero in existence
at time of deed's execution Ogden State
Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 P 705, dls
tinguished in 54 U 481, 182 1 357, 102
U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
Notes, given for value, constitute \ a l u
nbln consideration for mortgage securing
them Ogden State Bank v Barker, 12 U
13, 40 P 765, distinguished In 54 XT
481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d
1063
Where there is a valuable conaidera
tion which is stated to be fair, equivalent
for, and not disproportionate to value of
property conveyed, requirement as to
allegations and proof of fraud Is more
exacting Smith v Fdwards, 81 U 244,
17 P 2d 264
Whore wife owned substantial interest
in joint bank account and husband exe
cntcd note to wifo at her request upon
withdrawing substantial sum from such
account to invest in hazardous business,
nnd when it became due husband exe
cutcd renewal note secured by mortgage
on undivided one half interest m prop
eriy owned by them jointly, original note
was supported by valuable consideration,
and, hence, mortgage was not fraudulent
as to creditors Williams v Peterson, 86
U 526, 46 P 2d 6^74
A debt barred by statute of limitations
may nevertheless be consideration for
assignment of interest in an estate, even
as between close relations Boccalero v
Bee, 102 U )2, 12* P 2d 1063
Voluntary conveyance
Deed, made for nominal consideration
onl), is mere \o\vntnry
ennvoynnco and
A old ns to gr«ntor's creditors whose claims
wore in existence at time of its execution
and who would, if it was to be given ef
feet, be defrauded of their rights or hin
dered or delayed in collecting their claims
Ogden State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40
P 76% distinguished in 54 U 481, 182
P 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
A c o n \ e y a n c e without consideration is
voluntary, but not for that reason alone
fraudulent Smith v Edwards, 81 U 244,
17 P 2d 264
An owner may convey exempt prop
erty to anyone including his wife with

25-1-4

out liming such convejnnco overthrown
bv creditors, pro\ided ho makes the
proper defense when sush transaction is
annulled by or on behalf o( creditors
Williama v Peterson, 86 II »>26, 46 P 2d
674, Cardon v Harper, 106 U 560, 151
P 2d 0»> 154 A L B 006
Conveyance of property worth $14,000
to 115,000, which netted only about $180
a venr to party in satisfaction of pre
existing debt of $10,000, held not a fraud
ulent conveyance Utah Assets Corp v
Dooley Bros A s s n , 02 U 577, 70 P 2d
738
Collateral References
Fraudulent Convo)ancea£=»70(l)
37 C J 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 140
37 Am Jur 2d 707, 708, Fraudulent
f on\cyanco8 §J 18, 10
Antecedent dtbt transaction in consid
eratton of discharge of antecedent debt
owed by one other than grantor as based
on "fiir consideration' under Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 30 A L R
2d 1200
Assumption of mortgige as considers
tion for conveyance attacked as in fraud
of creditors 6 A L It 2d 270
Attorney's fees conveyance or transfer
in consideration of legal services, ren
dered or to be rendered, ns fraudulent as
against creditors, 45 A L R 2d 500
Conveyance in consideration of future
support as fraudulent against creditors, 2
A L R 1438, 23 A L R 584
Conveyance pursuant to antenuptial
agreement as fraud on creditors, 41 A L
R 1163
FfTect of words "valuo received" or si mi
lar words In written instrument, other
than ncgoti iblo instrument or scnled in
strunicut to create presumption or make
prima facio case of consideration, 116 A
L R 545
Futuro tort
conveyance ns fraudulent
where mnde in contemplation of possible
liability for future tort, 38 A L R 3d
507
Purchase of annuity by debtor as fraud
on creditor, 154 A L R 727
Transfer of property by debtor to cor
poratlon, m consideration of its stock, as
a fraud on creditors, 85 A L R 133
Validity of mortgage securing unlimited
future advances, 81 A L R 631

26-1 4. Conveyances by insolvent —Every convej ance made, and every
obligation incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent,
if the con\eyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair con
Bidcration
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 4 ; R. 8. 1933
fc 0. 1943, 33 1-4.

Bowman Co. v. White, 13 U. (2d)
369 P. 2d 962.

Application.
Conveyance of proper! v north $14,000
to * 15,000, which netted'only about f l 8 0
n year, to pnrly in satisfaction of preexisting drlit of fl0,000, held not n fraudulrnt conveyance. Utah Assets Corp. v.
Uooley Bros. AHSU., 92 U. 577, 70 P. 2d
73.9.

Evidence.
Whether an assignment of an interest
in an estate was in good faith and not to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or
was made for such purpose, depends upon
the facts and circumstances surrounding
the transaction, as gathered from the
badges of fraud present. Boccalero v.
Pee, 102 U. 12, 126 P. 2d 1063.
There was sufficient evidence to warrant finding that conveyance and bill of
sain were executed on the part of both
the grnntor and grantee with actual intent
to hinder, delay and defraud creditors,
ami that said transaction was fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. Cardon v. Harper, 106 U. 560, 151 P.
2d 99, 154 A. L. It. 906.
In an action on notes executed by tho
defendants and to establish n lien on property conveyed by one of the defendants
to his children, the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the lower court's findings that
the conveyances were not fraudulent and
to sustain a judgment denying a lien.
Civan v. Lambeth, 10 V. (2d) 287, 351 P.
2d 959.
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as
to creditors must be determined from the
facts of each case and from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, keeping in mind that the purpose of the
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (25-1-1 to
25 1-16) is not to prevent a debtor from
securing his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman
Co. v. Whito, 13 U. (2d) 173, 369 P. 2d 962.

Conveyance between husband and wife.
Conveyance by husband to wife for
nominal consideration, hold, under fircuiiistnnees, constructively fraudulent mid
\oid as to existing rrcditors, without proof
of nctun! fraud. Oustin v. Mathews, 25 U.
163, 70 |». 402.
Assignment by husband \o his wife of
homo held not fraudulent conveyance
whore widow established pood faith of her
transaction by showing evidence of ad\ancrment to husband for construction of
the house and for carrying on his business,
l.und v. Howell, 02 U.*232, 67 P. 2d 215.
hi suit to set nsido conveyance from
husband to wife, no actual fraudulent
intent will be required, when there was
no fair value or consideration given, and
the olTVct of the transfer is to render
the grantor insolvent. Cardon v. Harper,
106 IT. 500, 151 P. 2d 99, 154 A. L. R. 906.
Vcrrce setting- aside fraudulent conveynnce by husband to wife can properly
operate only to rescind the transfer of
whatever title the husband conveyed to
his wife. It ennnot disturb the wife's
rights accruing by virtue of 75-1-1 and 754 3. Cardon v. Harper, 106 U. 560, 151 P.
*_M 99. 154 A. L. H. 906.
Conveyances between relations.
Conveyances between near relatives, cal
cubited to pievent a creditor from realizing on his claim against one of such
relative*, are subject to rigid scrutiny.
I'axton v. Pnxton, 80 U. 540, 15 P. 2d
1051, distinguished in 92 IT. 232, 67 P. 2d
215 and 102 U. 12, 126 P. 2d lOfi.1.
The mere fact that the transection is
among close relatives does not necessarily
moan that if is invalid, but the true facts
ate subject to proof. Oivan v. Lambeth,
10 U. (2d) 2*7, 351 P. 2d 959.
A note and mortgage executed by son
in good faith to secure a pre existing
obligation which the son owed his father
was not a fraudulent conveyance. Ned J.
HUM man ('•» v. White, 13* IT. (2d) 173,
3iW P. 2d 962.
Conveyances between close relatives are
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that
close relatives are involved does not rentier the conveyance fraudulent. Ned J.

173,

"Fair equivalent."
"Fair equivalent" used in 25-1 3 means
something other than "exact equivalent"
or "full value," since "fair" modifies and
restrict* "equivalent " Utah Assets Corp.
v. Dooiov Bros. Assn., 92 U. 577, 70 P. 2d
738.
Mortgage as conveyance.
A mortgage made without fair consideration, which will render the person making it insolvent, constitutes stntutory
fraud, and the existence of a subjective
intention to defraud is not required. Ned
.1. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 U. (2d) 173,
369 P. 2d 962.
Preferences.
Kven if preference, effected by debtor
by way of mortgnge securing notes executed for value, was given with fraudulent design or with intent to hinder nnd
delay judgment creditor in collecting his
judgment, validity of mortgage would not
be nfTected by such fact if neither trustee
in mortgage nor owner of notes pnrticipat-
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ed in or had knowledge of fraud. Ogden
Rtate Bank v. Barker, 12 U. 27, 40 P.
769, citing Pet tit v. Parsons, 9 U. 223,
33 P. 1038. The Ogden case has been distinguished in 54 U. 481, 182 P. 357 nnd 102
XL 12, 126 P. 2d 1063. Tho Pettit esse
has been distinguished in 10 U. 96, 37 P.
242.
Debtor hns right to prefer one creditor
over another. Ogden 8tate Bank v. Barker,
12 IJ. 27, 40 P. 769, distinguished in 54
U. 481, 182 P. 357 nnd 102 U. 12, 126 P.
2d 1063.
Collateral References.
Fraudulent Conveynnccs«J=»74(l).
37 C.I.8. Fraudulent Conveyances § 163.

25-1-7

37 Am. Jur. 2d 694 of seq., Fraudulent
Conveyances § 5 el seq.
Antenuptial agreement, conveyance pursuant to, as fraud on creditors, 41 A. L. B.
1163.
Right of insolvent to insure life for
benofit of relatives, 31 A. L. R. 51, 34
A. L. R. 838.
Use of debtor's individual funds or property for acquisition, improvement of, or
discharge of liens on, property hold in estate by entireties as a fraud upon creditors, 7 A. L. R. 2d 1104.
Validity and effect as against creditors of change of beneficiary or assignment of insurance policy from estate to
individual, 106 A. L. It. 696.

26-1-6. Conveyances by persons in business.—Every conveyance made
without fnir consideration, when the person making it is engaged, or is
nhout to engage, in a business or transaction for which the properly remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital,
is fraudulent as to creditors, and as to other persons who become creditors
during the continuance of such business or transaction, without regard
to his actual intent.
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 6 ;
1933 & C. 1913, 33-1-5.

R. 8.

Collateral Referepces.
Fraudulent
ConreynnccsC=374(l).
37 C..T.R. Fraudulent Conveyances § 163.

Right of creditors or their representatives to complain of voluntary transfer or
pledge of corporate assets by corporation
which subsequently becomes insolvent, 117
A. L. R. 1263.

25-1-6. Conveyances by persons about to incur debts.—-Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, without fair consideration, when
the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends
to, or believes that he will, incur debts beyond bis ability to pay as they
mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 6 ; R. S. 1933
fc O. 1943, 33-1-6.
Collateral References.
Fraudulent Conveyances«J=>74(l).
37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 163.
Attorney's fees: conveyance or transfer
in consideration of legal services, ren-

dored or to be rendered, ns fraudulent as
against creditors, 45 A. L. R. 2d 500.
Future tort, conveyance ns fraudulent
where made in contemplation of possible
liability for, 38 A. L. R. 3d 597.
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment,
to attack conveyance or transfer ns fraudulent, 73 A. L. R. 2d 749.

25-1-7. Conveyance to binder, delay, defraud creditors.—-Every conveyance made, nnd every obligation incurred, with actual intent, as distinguished from intent, presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either
present or future creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors.
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 7 ; R. S. 1933
& C. 1943, 33-1-7.

Oross-Refsrence.
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor,
76 6 511.

347

2 5 i-7

FRAUD

Construction and application
1 his section docs not applr where no
question of fraud is rained b) the plead
ings, nor anv e\nlence offered relating
to such question 8keen v \ an 8ickle, 80
U 419, 15 r 2d 344
Conveyances between relations.
The mere fact that the transaction Is
among close relatives does not necessarily
mean that it is invalid, but the true facts
are subject to proof Givan v Lambeth,
10 U (2d) 287, 351 P 2d 9V>
A note and mortgage executed by son
in good faith to secure a pre existing ob
ligation which the son owed his father
wns not a fraudulent conveyance Ned J
How man Co v \N hite, 13 U (2d) 173, 369
V 2d *>«)2
Convtvnnces between close relatives arc
subject to rigid s< rutmy but the fsct that
clone relatives are involved does not render
th« conveyance fraudulent Ned J Bow
nuiu t o v White, H V (2d) 17% 369 P
2d «!«2
Conveyance to wife
Where the debtors wife had both pro
tided initial funds for purchasing real es
tato and had held previously owned real
estate in her mine, fact that property on
which husband g creditors sought judgment
lien had been transferred from husband to
wife did not establish intent to defraud
creditors Ihllstcad v Leavitt, 25 U (2d)
82, 475 P 2d 1017
Voluntary conveyance
Fact that grantee in voluntary convey
unco does not participate in any fraud
against grantors existing creditors, or
flint grantee accepts deed in good faith,
without intent to defraud such creditors,
will not relieve grantee from effect and
operation of such conveyance
Ogden
State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 P
761 distinguished in 54 U 481, 182 P
1«>7 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
Former rule was that voluntary eon
vcvnncc, made by debtor who was in
embarrassed financial circumstances was
constructively fraudulent, and would be
held void, a* to existing creditors with
nut proof of actual fraud, and even
though grantee had no knowledge of
fraudulent intent on part of grantor Og
den State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40
P 76">, distinguished in 54 U 481, 182
V 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063
Collateral References
Fraudulent Conveyances€=»24(2)
37 C T 8 Fraudulent Convevances § 33
17 Am Jnr 2d 696 et seq , Fraudulent
tonvcv mccs § 6 et seq

Admissibility of declarations of grantor
or transferor on issue as to whether con
veyniice or transfer was in fraud of credi
tors, 83 A L It 1446
Admissibility of testimony of transferee
as to his knowledge, purpose, Intention
or good faith on issue whether conveyance
wns in fraud of transferor's croditors, 62
A L B 2d 418
Agreement by husband that wife shall
receive proceeds of sale of homestead as
fraud on his creditors, 6 A L It 574
Attorney's fees conveyance or transfer
in consideration of legal services, rendered
or to be rendered, as fraudulent against
creditors 45 A L It 2d 600
Conveyance between third persons upon
consideration furnished by debtor as with
in nppbention of Fraudulent Conveyance
Act, 01 A L R 741
Conveyance or transfer hy stockholder
as fraudulent as regards his liability as
stockholder to creditors of corporation, 89
A L It 751
( reditors receipt of proceeds of convoy
mice or transfer bv debtor as estopping
him to claim that conveyance or transfer
was fraudulent, 9 A L It 358
Creditor's right to attack as fraudulent
a conveyance by third person to debtor's
spouse, 35 A L R 2d 8
Den>ing relief to one who conveyed his
proper!) to defraud his creditors as ap
plimblc whtre the threatened claim which
occiiHioncd the conveyance was paid or
was never established, 21 A L R 2d 589
Fact that the parties to a conveyance in
fraud of creditors nro not in pari delicto
as affecting the right of the party guilty
of fraud to relief, 7 A L R 150
Future tort conveyance as fraudulent
where mi do in contemplation of possible
liability for, 38 A L R 3d 507
(•ift by husband as fraud on wife, 64
A L R 466, 49 A L R 2d 521
(lift of debtors services to third person
as fraud on creditors, 28 A L R 1046
Liens use of debtor's individual funds
or property for acquisition, improvement
of, or discharge of hens on, property
held in estate by entireties as a fraud
upon creditors, 7 A L R 2d 1104
Mortgage
assumption of mortgage as
consideration for conveyance attacked as
in fraud of creditors, 6 A L R 2d 270
Principle which denies relief to party
who has conveyed or transferred property
in fraud of his creditors, as affected by
execution, as part of, or as contemplated
at time of, the fraudulent transaction, of
reconveyance or retransfer of the property
to him, 89 A L R 1166
Priority of judgment over conveyance
made after beginning of term but prior to
rendition of judgment, 5 A L R 1072

34B
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Right iif grantee or transferee lo be
reimbursed fur i \petiditur< s in pnvment
of t s x i s or ciiiutuhrnncrR on properly
where convevmice or lr»n*ter is in fraud
of creditors, 8 A L It 627
Right of grnntee, transferee or mort
gngee in instrument fraudulent as to cred
itors to protection to extent of considera
tion paid by him, 70 A L 11 132
Right of grantor or transferor or his
privies lo attack conveyance or transfer
made for purpose of evading taxation,
118 A 1, R 1184
Right of parent as against creditor or
Honor to make gift to minor child of lat
tor's own services, 44 A L R 876
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment,
to attack conveyance or transfer as fraud
ulcnt, 73 A L R 2d 749

25 1-8

transfer of proporlv by debtor to cor
porsfion, in consideration of its stock, as
n fraud on creditors, 85 A L R 133
Validity and effect as against creditors
of change of beneficiary or assignment of
insurance poliej from estate to individual,
106 A I R 500
Validity as against creditors of change
of beneficiary of insuranco policy from
estate to individual, 6 A L R 1178, 106
A L R B96
Validity as against creditors of trustee
or one deriving his right from trustee, of
conveyance or transfer to carry out terms
of unenforceable parol trust, 64 A L It
576
Validity of assignment of future book
accounts, 72 A L R 856

26 1 8 When conveyance or assignment void —Every conveyance or
assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands, or
in goods or things in action, or of rents or profits issuing therefrom, and
e\ery charge upon Innds, goods or things in action or upon the rents or
profits thereof, made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors,
or other persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or de
mantis, and everv bond or other evidence of debt gi\cn, suits commenced,
or decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the person
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void
History R 8 1868 & O L 1907, § 2 4 7 4 ,
O L 1917, § 6 8 2 1 , R S 1933 * O 1943,
33-1 8
Compiler's N o t e s
Analogous former statutes, Comp Laws
1870, § 1017, 2 Comp 1 aw» 1888, § 28 IS
Construction and application
This section is substantially the same as
13 Elir c •», and is merely declaratory
of the principles of the common law
United States v Late Corporation of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
8aints, 5 U 538, 18 P 35
Under this section the assignment of
the corporate property of the Church of
Tcsns Christ of Latter D i y Saints, pend
ing dissolution of that corporation by Act
of Congress was held in fraud of the
rights oft the government and void as to
the receiver, the government being in
eluded in the words ' other persons"
United States v Late Corporation of
Church of JCHUS Christ of Latter Day
Ssnnts 5 U 538, 18 P 35
Insolvency is not required to make this
section operative Ogden State Bank v
Marker, 12 U 13 40 P 765, distinguished
in *54 U 481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12,
126 P 2d 1061
Statute was not intended to prevent
debtor from pa>mg or securing his hon

est debts, or from doing equity and exact
justice to all of his creditors by placing
his means at their disposal Billings v
Parsons, 17 U 22, 53 P 730
Assignments generally
Under this section an assignment of
property is not void which among other
things provides that the assignees out of
tho proceeds of "personal property" will
pay, and thst assignees accept trust and
agree to execute snme by disposing of the
property and collecting the chosen in ac
tion due assignor and applying proceeds to
pnyment of debts It does not confer au
thority to sell on credit 8precht v Par
sons, 7 U 107, 25 P 730
Rule that sale or assignment of chat
tels, unaccompanied by chnnge of pos
session, is fraudulent per se as to execu
tion creditors of, or subsequent purchasers
from, seller or assignor does not neces
s a n l y apply to assignments for benefit of
creditors, but long delay in taking pos
session is circumstance from which fraud
may be prima facie inferred Snyder v
Murdock, 20 U 419, 59 P 91
Conditional sales
Assignment for benefit of creditors held
void as to seller of personal property in
assignor's possession under contract of
conditional sale, condition of which was
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tinptrfuimctl Kiiiri if ciupowertd aMigntc
tn mil assigned propertv on credit C harks
J ippmtott & t o v Hich, JO U 140, 56 P
Evidence of fraud
A primn facie case tlint property wan
innvtved to son of one of the defendants
with tuti tit to defrnud judgment creditors
w is established by evidence indicating
I nth nominal consideration for the prop
crtv nnd defendants' indebtedness at time
of conveyance Brimhall v Grow, 25 U
(2il) 2«>8, 480 P 2d 731
Extent of invalidity of assignment.
An general rule, assignment which is
f r uidnlent in fnct is void in toto W P
Nobln Mercantile < o v Mt
Pleasant
1 quitnhlu C o o p IiiHt, 12 U 213 42 P
8l,<» distinguished in 1*> U 110, 47 P 604
mid 18 IT 42 5r> P 77
As general rule assignment which is
\ m d in part is \oitl in its entirety \\ P
Noble Mercantile Co v Mt
Pleasant
1 quit iblc C o o p Inst
12 U 2 H 42 P
Hl)(> distinguished m 15 U 110, 47 P 604
and 18 V 42, r>"> P 77
Homesteads
A homestead ° »nnot be made subject
of attack by a creditor upon ground that
it w i s sold or convened m fraud of such
creditor P i v s o n Exch Sn\ Bnuk v Pict
j«n, 63 I! 321, 225 P r»<»8, explained in
80 U 2ri7, 42 P 2d 989
Presumption of fraud
Where grnntor was hcavilv indebted at
time of his execution of voluntary con
vojanee, inference n that conveyance wns
fraudultntl) made for purpose of hinder
nig ind delating grantors creditors Og
d m State nank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40
P 70S, applying identical section in Comp
I i n s of 1888 distinguished in 54 U 481,
182 P 3r»7 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1061
Right of corporate directors to prefer
themselves
When eorpornti n h IH become insolvent
and ihiindoiu d objects for which it was
treated, its directors cannot, by volun
tary deed of assignment prefer them
selves, as corporate creditors, over other
sut h treditors whose claims are equally

meritorious R<» IS to setuie nd\ iiitagc
eiver h l t e r l \ reason of directors' ofllcial
positions nnd th« ir consequent snporior
knowledge of corporation's affairs W P
Noble Mercantile Co v Mt
Pleasant
Tquitable Co op Inst , 12 U 213, 42 P
869, distinguished in 15 U 110, 47 P
604 and 18 U 42, 55 P 77
\N hen nsHignmcnt of property of cor
porntion, which has become insolvent and
abandoned objects for which it was ere
nted contains fraudulent preferences in
favor of directors as corporate creditors,
such fact of itself indicates fraudulent,
intent on directors' part W P Noble
Mercantile Co \ Mt Pleasant Equitable
C o o p Inst 12 U 213, 42 P 869, distm
guished in 15 U 110, 47 P 604 and 18
U 42 55 P 77
Fact t i n t directors assert t i n t they
hid no frnu lulent intent, when, after
corporation had become insolvent, they
made assignment of corporate property
whn.lt constituted preference in their
favor as corporate creditors, is imniatc
rial as far as invalidity of assignment
is concerned, since directors must be pre
sumed to have intended probable conse
quences of their act W P Noble Mcrcan
tile Co v Mt Pleasant Fquitoble C o o p
Inst
12 V 213, 42 P 869, distinguished
in 15 U 110, 47 P C04 and 18 U 42, 55
P 77
Collateral References
Fraudulent ConvcvanccsC=>24(2)
37 C-T 8 r rniidulent Conrejances § 23
*• nforccibilitj, as between parties, of an
executory agreement made in fraud of
creditors, 172 A I, J{ 1121
r x c e s i i v e s c c u n t j for debt as affecting
question of fraud upon creditors 138 A
1 R 10r»l
Priority of judgment over conveyance
made after beginning ot term but prior to
ren lition of judgment, 5 A L R 1072
Hents and profits
accountability nnd
liability for rents and profits of gr intee
of f r ludulentlj conveved real property,
00 A h It 2d ri«>3
Hight of wife or chill by virtue of right
to support to maintain action to set aside
convejance bj husband or parent as fraud
uleitt, without reductng claim to judg
ment, 164 A L U 524

25 1 9 Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers—Effect of notice at
time of purchase—E%cr\ < on\e\itnte of any estate or interest m lands, or
the rents or profits of lands, and e\cry charge upon lands, or the rents or
profits thereof, made or created with intent to defraud prior or subsequent
purchasers thereof for a valuable consideration shall be void as against
such purchaser* But no such conveyance or charge shall he deemed
360
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fraudulent in fax or of a subsequent purchaser who had actual oi construe
ti\e notice thereof at the time of his pun base, unless it appears that the
grantee in such conwnancc, or the person to be benefited by such charge,
was privy to the fraud intended
History R 8 1898 & O L 1907. §§ 2464,
2465, O L. 1917, §§5814, 6816, R 8 1933
4c O 1043, 33-1 0

be paid on its due date but was to bo ex
tended from time to time McKibbon r
Hrighnm, 18 U 7S, ftS P 60

Compiler s Notes
Analogous former statute, 2 Contp I aws
1888, §2833

Collateral References
fraudulent Conv e y n n c c s C ^ l
37 C J 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 286

Mortgagor remaining in possession
Mortgage on stock of merchandise held
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of
mortgagor, where mortgagor remained in
possession nf mortgaged proper! v and
continued tn sell it in usual courso of
hiiHiucHH pnrsu mt to mcrelj verbnl agree
ment with mortgagee which agreement
eonlt mpl itcd that mortgage was not to

Grantor's continued possession ot land
after execution of deed as notice of his
claim adverse to title convened, 105 A
L R 845
1 cngth of period of possession beforo
arrriuil of rights of perHon sought to be
niTtctid b) notitc as affecting tho rulo
regarding constructive notice from pos
session of real property, 105 A L It 892

25 110
partnership
partnership
partnership
(1) To
partnership
(2) To
nership, as

Conveyance of partnership property -—Ever} conusance of
property, ami e\cr} partnership obligation incurred, when the
is or will be therebv rendered insolvent is ftnudulcnt as to
creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred,
a partner, whether with or without a promise b\ him to pay
debts, or,
a1 person not a partner without fair consideration to the partdistinguished from consideration to the individual partners

History
I*. 1925. ch 42, § 8. R 8 1933
fc C 1943, 33 1 15

Rights ot partners when
rescinded, 18 1 36

Cross References
Preferences to limited partner, 48 2 13

Collateral References
Partnership<5=>180
68 C T S Partnership § 180

agreement is

2 5 1 1 1 Trust for grantor void—All deeds, gifts tonvevnnces, trans
fcrs or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, t battels, or things in
action made in trust for the use of the person making the same Rball be
void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of such person
History R 8 1808 A C L 1007. § 2466,
O L. 1017, §5816 R. 8 1933 * O 1943
33 1 11
Construction and application
This section relates only to transfers
of personal property not real property
Genrv \ C n n , 70 U 268, 9 P 2d 396
Collateral References
Fraudulent Conv evauccsC=>lll
37 V 3 8 r raudulent Conv ev ances § 219

TcVsorvntion to settlor of trust or other
grantor of right to rovoke or to with
draw securities or other property and
substitute others as affecting validity as
against creditors 92 A L R 282
Validity as agaiust creditors of convey
ance m trust for settlor for life with re
nmnder to his appointees, 93 A L R
1211
Validity of trust created by nontesta
mentary instrument reserving benefit to
settlor for life with power of revocation,
73 A L R 209, 32 A L R 2d 1270

\bsolute conveyance or transfer with
secret reservation as fraudulent per se
as a g n n s t creditors, 68 A L R 306
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25 1-12 "Creditor*," "purchasers" includes heirs —Every conveyance,
charge, instrument or proceeding declared to be void by the provisions of
this chapter as against creditors and purchasers shall be equally void as
against the heirs, successors, personal representatives or assigns of such
creditors or purchasers
History R 8 1 8 9 8 * 0 L 1907, §2475,
0 L. 1917, § 6 8 2 2 , R 8 1933 ft 0 1943,
33 1 12

Collateral References
Fraudulent Convcyances<8=^
37 C.J 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 4

25 1 13 Bona flde purchasers not affected —The provisions of this
chapter shall not be construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grnntor, or of
the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor
History R 8 1898 ft O I, 1907, §2476,
O I* 1917, § 6 8 2 3 , R 8 1933 ft O 1943,
33 1 13
Collateral References
Fraudulent Convevanren<3=»102
M r 1 fl Fraudulent Convejances § 201
Necessity
of
participation
by
the
grintee or transferee in the fraud of the
grantor or transferor in order to avoid
a \oluntnry convejance or transfer as
against creditors 17 A L R 728
Presumption and burden of proof as re
gards good faith and consideration on
part of purchaser or one taking encum
hrnmc subsequent to unrecorded convey
nice or encumbrance, 107 A L R 502
Right of grantee, mortgagee or trans
fcrec in instrument fraudulent as to credi

tors to protection to extent of considt ra
tion paid by htm 70 A L II 112
Right of grantee, or his p r m e s , to main
tain suit or proceeding for affirmative re
lief, where claim ii made or anticipated
that conveyance was made with intention
on part of grantor, but without actual
fraud bj grantee, to defraud formers
creditors, 128 A L R 1504
Right of grantee or transferee to be
reimbursed for expenditures in payment
of taxes or encumbrances on property
where conveyance or transfer is in fraud
of creditors, 8 A L R 527
Rights as between creditors of frandu
lent grantor, where one or more of them,
in payment of or as security for his debt,
rccei>es deed or mortgage from fraudulent
grantee, 114 A L R 406

25 1 14 Sales without change of possession —Every sale made bv a
seller of goods or chattels in his possession or under his control, and
c\ery assignment of goods and chattels, unless the same is accompanied
by a deli\er\ within a reasonable time, and is followed by an actual and
continued change of the possession of the things sold or assigned, shall
he conclusive evidence of fraud as against the creditors of the seller or
assignor, or subsequent purchasers in good faith The word "creditors"
as used m this section shall be construed to include all persons who shall
be creditors of the seller or assignor at any time while such goods and
chattels shall remain in his possession or under his control
History R 8 1898 ft C L 1907, § 2 4 7 3 ,
R 8 1933 ft O 1943, 33-1 14
Compiler s Notes
Analogous former statutes, Comp Laws
1876, § 1016, 2 Comp l a w s 1888, §2837
Assignee of prior claims
Under this section, where plaintiff, after
filing of chattel mortgage, secured assign
ment of a claim against the mortgagor
which had accrued previous to the filing,

rRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
A l b ii K U r n
Id IT
l i i i I M I 4 P , 100J

r

i7'», ICT P

r

>78, A n n

hlttn) hfidgtft of fraud nra net out in
Boccnlcro v lice, 102 U 12, 126 P 2d
1001
Bona flde purchasers
Convejance of homestead by debtor to
wife and by her to third person for cash,
mortgage to her, and assumption of bus
l a n d s debt to nnother, also secured by
mortgage given by purchaser, who sub
scquently paid said assumed debt, where
transactions were completed prior to any
judgment against debtor husband, and
purchaser from wife was unaware of this
latter indebtedness, was not voidable as
fraudulent Btnte Bank of Beaver County
v Mortensen, 66 U 290, 241 P 1055
Change of possession
( hangc of possession must be actual
and not merely constructive or colorable
Tver, tt \ Brigham, 14 U 242, 47 P 75
Posmsiion iinist be continuous in pur
ehaiir and not merely delivery and sur
rcnd« r bnck 1 \crott v Brigham, 14 U
242 47 P 71
After delivery of possession, vendee
may appoint vendor to hold property for
him as his trustee or agent, or may make
htm his cmplojio, but such appointment
or employment must be in good faith, and
may bo regarded as suspicious circum
stance and be considered by jury, with all
of other evidence, in determining whether
possession w i s taken and held in good
fmth Lverctt v „Brigham, 14 U 242, 47
P Ti
Bale of machinery by corporation to
newly orgini7cd operational subsidiary
in good faith cannot be voided on behalf
of one who became creditor after trans
for, on ground that there was no change
of possession and transaction, therefore,
was fraudulent Boston Acme Mines De
tttlopment Co v Clnwson, 66 U 103, 240
P 105

plaintiff acquired all rights of such mort
gagor therein, including right to invall
date mortgage Volker Lbr Co v Utah
3c Oregon Lbr Co, 45 U 603, 148 P 365,
Ann Cat 1917D, 1158

' Creditor" defined
The term "creditor" includes all per
sons who may have claims against mort
gagor at any time while mortgaged goods
and chattels remnin in his possession
Volker Lbr Co v Utah A Oregon Lbr
Co, 45 V 603, 148 P 365, Ann Cas.
1Q17D, 1158, applying this section and
9 1 1 (since repealed) dealing with requi
sites for validity of a chattel mortgage

Badges of fraud
Transaction of s i l e without delivery
or chingo of possession of things sold,
w i s fraudulent an against creditors of
vendor so as to authorise granting of
attachment
Charleston Co op v A W

Evidence
In action for allegedly wrongful con
\ersion of wool by defendant judgment
creditor of owner, which owner had de
Incrcd wool to plaintiffs in payment of
debt, held that, although arrangement
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l e t n e e n owner and plaintiffs for trans
pnrtalinn of wool bj debtor of owner
might he sdNpirioiift circumstance, it couid
not be regarded, as matter of law, as
conclusive evidence of fraud Everett v
Brigham, 14 U 242 47 P 75
In action for allegedly wrongful eon
version of wool by defendant judgment
creditor of owner, which owner had de
livered wool to plaintiffs in payment of
debt, held that, under evidence, questions
of whether plaintiffs' subsequent posses
sion of wool was actual or merely color
able, and of whether it was continuous,
were questions for jury
Everett v
Brigham, 14 U 242, 47 P TS
Where a debtor in a cleaning business
gave a bill of sale to plaintiff but kept
and used the equipment involved and re
ceived additional equipment from the
plaintiff who retained title under a condi
lional sales contract, the plaintiff was not
entitled to a summary judgment in an
action involving tho machinery since there
was a disputed fact question as to notice
to or knowledge of tho sale by defendant
who had loaned money secured by chattel
mortgages on the machinery
Martin
M ichinery v Btrevell Paterson Finance
Co , 7 U (2d) 316, 324 P 2d 770
History of section
It will be noted that this section was
taken from Comp Laws 1907, due to the
fact that the last sentence was repealed
by Comp Laws 1917, and waa restored
in 1933 8ce Hansen v Daniels, 73 U 142,
272 P 941
Pleadings.
Allegation in action to set aside con
veyance that grtntor
rem&lna in posses
sion of land after its conveyance is an
allegation of fact, and may or may not
prove fraud Smith v Fdwnrds, 81 U 244,
17 P 2d 264
Presumptions and burden of proof
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels,
unaccompanied by change of possession, is
fraudulent per se as to execution creditors
of, or subsequent purchasers from, seller
or assignor does not necessarily apply to
assignments for benefit of creditors, but
long delay in taking possession is circum
stance from which fraud may be prima
facie inferred Snyder v Murdock, 20 U
419, 59 P 91
Reasonable time for delivery
Reasonable time should be allowed In
which to make delivery White v Pease,
15 U 170,49 P 416
In action for conversion by judgment
creditor and officers levying execution
on gram claimed by plaintiff to have
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It It \ « r* «f 11» In in l»3 j u lg

tin lit fl» I tor, held thtt under ox idenei
t|inMions of what win reasonable tint*1,
niitlor nil of circumstunces of case, for
milking delivery of grain, and of whether
frnnsmhon between judgment debtor and
plaintiff w IN fraudulent, were questions
for jut)
While v Tease, 15 U 170, 49
J* 416
I here It no fixed rule, which will gor
< rn nil cases, as to what ia necessary
to constitute such delivery and change
of possession as are required b> this sec
lion, but each case must be governed by
its own particular facts and circam

Millie* HIIHI, v Mclornlck, 15 U 188, 40
V W
What constitutes delivery within rei
sonnble tune, and actual and continued
change of possession, are generally facta
which depend largely on kind and nature
of property, situation of parties, and cir
cumstnnees peculiar to each case Blish v
McComick, 15 U 188, 49 P 529
Collateral References
Fraudulent Conveyances<§=>135
37 CJ-8 Fraudulent Conveyances §180
37 Am. Jur 2d 731 et seq , Fraudulent
Conveyances § 42 et seq

25 1 15 Rights of creditors with matured claims —Where a convey
anec or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, audi creditor, uhen JIIH
clnim hns matured, mn>, as against an\ person cx< cpt a purchaser for fair
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the tune of the purchase
or one who litis dcn\ed title immediately or mediately from such a pur
ihaser
(1) Ua\c the comeyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim, or,
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or lev> execution upon,
the property conveyed
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than
a fair consideration for the comeyance or obligation ma> retain the property or obligation as security for repayment
History L. 1925, ch 42, § 0 , B S 1933
ft C 1943, 33 1 15
Defenses
Defend int in suit to set aside convey
ance to his wife as fraudulent may in
terpose defense that property is exempt
from execution, and does not exceed in
\nluo his maximum homestend, and upon
submission of proof thoreof bv defend
nut, court will be required to make find
mgs with respect thereto
Cardon v
Harper, 106 U 560, 151 P 2d 99, 154
A I R 906, following Williams v Peter
«on, 80 U r>26, 46 P 2d 674
—evidence
When deed is attacked by creditors
whose deininds were in existence at
lime of its execution, and deed, if effec
live, put it beyond power of grantor to
meet his liabilities, burden of proof is
on grantee, or those claiming under him,
to show such consideration as will re
lease deed from imputation that it is
fraudulent as to such creditors, and was
made to hinder and defraud them in col
lectmg their demands Ogden Btnte Bank
v Barker 12 U 11, 40 P 765, dutin
guitfhed ut 54 U 481, 182 P 357 and
102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063

So far as grantee's burden of proving
consideration is concerned, deed's recital
of consideration is not evidence of fact
thereof as against creditors whose claims
accrued prior to deed's execution Ogdcn
State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 P 765,
distinguished in 54 U 481, 182 P 357
and 102 L 12, 126 P Cd 1063
Jvidence in action to set aside con
veynnce bv grantor of property of fair
value of 13,250 for $10 and other valu
able consideration to daughters, held to
show that conveyance was fraudulent as
to creditors Zuniga v Evans, 87 U 198,
48 P 2d 513, 101 A L R 532, distin
ginshed in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1061
Garnishment proceeding
Fact that pleadings in garnishment pro
ceedings repealed that indebtedness sued
upon was that of individuals and that
those individuals had no account with
garnishee bank, the only account being
with corporation owned by individuals,
did not make cause of action one, under
this section, to set aside conveyance, and
thus argument that court had never ob
tamed jurisdiction of corporate defendant
or of res since no service of summons
was made upon corporation could not be
maintained,
the pleading
sufficiently
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FRAUDUirNI" C O N N I A A N L I *
v«iil Ntd ? I i o w i m t i v o
(-M) 17 I If ) I
I «iij

averred a *h mi f iitus it lion between tho
nidi* idiuth nut tho cot porn t inn so that
tlit.> should bo considered tin itj* litir«l for
put post of g iiiushmcnt prot ccdmgs Mint
\ Giroln 0 tl (2d) 22,317 P 2d 62
Transfer of stock could be set nsldo as
n fraudulent conveyance on motion in
garnishment proietdmg, and it vvaa not
accesstrj to (lie n separate action to oh
linn such relief
Tensi n v >ames, 10 U
(Jtl) 423, 519 P 2d 236

25 1 15
v White, 13 1!

—homesteid exemption
If lodgment debtors interest in ccr
t nit hind which had been set aside to
him as homestead b> bankruptcy court,
was greater in v tine than at time ot
»h M o r s conveyance of land to his wife
without
sufficient
eoitsiderntion
which
rendcied debtor insolvent I'tnh district
court would be justified in setting aside
SIM h convev nice is fraud on creditors,
and judgment creditor thereupon could
h i v e (xciuhnti issued and land could be
s s! • t iccnrdance with L'R 1 14 «nd 28 1
IS
Ostler i,nnd & Livtstotk Co v
Ilroiigh, III I )l( 178 P 2d 011

Presumptions and burden of proof
As to claims arising after a convev
njirn \n nuiiln mid placed upon record It
is imperative that a creditor, beforo he
entt set It aside must allege and prove
that he w is misled bj some overt not
into believing something different from
what the retord shout d Binith v Id
w ir.ln 81 V 21*, 17 V 2d 264
\N hero g r i u t i c s were in possrssu rt of
|Mimis(M purHimnt to duly r» cordt d dt t d
tut I wire pti>mg tnxes thoreon it WHS
uicunil cut upon plaintiffs in action to
set iiMido convev nice, to allege and prove
that grantees as such did certain acts
which misled plaintiffs, or held themselves
out in t way that misled plaintiffs and
that plaintiffs had knowledge and relied
thorcon Smith v Fdwnrds, 81 V 244, 17
P 2d 264
Purdcn of proof is not on plaintiff to
show tint properly, alleged to have been
fraudulently conveved, ia not exempt from
execution ( irdon v Harper, 106 U 560,
J rt 1 V 2d !>«», 1 r>4 A h R 906
Setting aside conveyance, limitation ot action
Where action lo set istdo convev nnccs
ctJttHid* r ttion for which was stated to bo
out dollar tit 1 other good and villi
title consideration, was not brought tin
hi sevtii veirs after conveyances were
made i nd recorded notion was barred
under fornu r three vcur statute of linn
tat tons suite discover} was made, or situ
ttion was such as to furnish full oppor
limit} for tlic discovery of fraud, if nnj
existed snore than three venrs before
bringing of the action, and limitation
statute began to run from time reason
nbl) prudent person would hnve invest!
gttcd the other valuable consideration
and discovered the falsity, if an) Smith
v 1 dwards, 81 U 244, 17 P 2d 264, dis
tinguished in 515 P 2d 1241
A creditor with a matured claim may
h i v e a mortgage, a conveyance under
25 1 1, set aside under this section to the
extent nccessnrv to satisfy his claim,
where such conveyance was made without
fair lonsideiation, defined in 25 1 3 , and
would render the person making it insol

—pleadings
1 n It r fonnir si iluto hi Id, in nction
in nnhire of trtditnrt bill brought to set
aside voluntiiv toiivevnneo b\ tit btor to
his HI ut (hit OIIIIMMIOII from bill of ullegM
tioii of insohtnrv at lime of coiMpjniiri s
extcutioii would not have bet n fttal to
bill, since insolvent v at stub tunc was not
f u t of jurisdictional t onsequem t and was
not, per sc, condition of relief
Ogden
State Bank v Marker 12 U 13 40 P 7b >
distinguished in r>4 U 481, 182 I 3r»7 and
102 LI 12, 126 P 2d 1001
Allegation* in nction to set aside con
v e j m c c s that lonvcjanccs were made
for the purpose of piacmg propcrfv be
jond rent h ot creditors and were made
us part of a 8t heme, without statement
of facts from which purpose could be in
ftrrcd and without stating facts con
stitntiiig s lirme tmotinted to no more
thin siving th it ronvevnuees were fraudu
lint Smith v 1 dwards, 81 U 244, 17 P
2.1 204
*. omplaint in it lion to sit aside con
VLMintc was not objt t tioimhlc for fnlure
to nllegt Hi it property involved in con
vtvnnce was not exempt Amiga v J v n n s ,
87 U 198, 4S V 2d 513, 101 A L R 532,
listingtiished in 102 U 12, '26 P 2d JOol
Collateral References
fraudulent Convcj iiicC8C=>208
37 C 1 S Irnudulent C o m c j a n c e s § 3 0 0
37 Am Tur 2d 788 et seq, 1 ruudulent
(. onve> IIIKCS § 10G et st q

Vdmisstbility of declarations of grantor
or transferor on issue as to whether con
vevance or transfer was in fraud of credi
tors 83 A L R 1446
Admissibility of subsequmt dc« Inrations
of vendor on issue whether sale was m
fraud ot creditors l>4 A L R 707
Assign tl ihlv of executors or ndminis
tritortt right to attack conveynnce or
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transfer 1»> decedent as fraud upon his
ireditors, 150 A L R 508
Conditions of creditor's bill or suit to
avoid conveyance as a fraud on creditors
whore creditor has recovered foreign judg
incut, 129 A L H 506
( rnditor's receipt of proceeds of convey
ance or transfer by debtor as estop
ping him to claim that conveyance or
transfer was fraudulent, 9 A L R 868
Criterion of jurisdictional amount in action in form of creditors' bill or suit to
avoid conveyance in fraud of creditors,
109 A L B 118*5
Death of grantee or transferee of proper! \ conveyed or transferred in fraud of
creditors as affecting rights of creditors of
grantor or transferor to attach same, 110
A I R 1190
Decree in suit by judgment creditor to
set aside conveyance in fraud of creditors
as bar to another suit for same purpose in
rripect of another conveyance, 108 A
I, R 699
Fact that debt, to pay or secure which
conveyance was made, was barred by limi
tut ion as affecting attack made upon it as
a fraud upon creditors, 109 A L R 1220
Judgment for fine or penalty as support
mg creditors suit to avoid fraudulent
conveyance or transfer before its entry,
48 A L R 605
Necessity
of
exhausting
remedies
against other judgment debtor before
bringing suit to set aside conveyance as
fraudulent 22 A L R 200
Necessity of participation by the gran
tee or transferee in the fraud of the
grantor or transferor in order to avoid a
voluntary conveyance of transfer as
against creditors 17 A L R 728
Nonresidence or absence of debtor as
obviating ncccHSitv of procuring judg
nient as condition of creditor's bill, 38
A I, R 269
Pleading and proof of exempt character
of property in suit to set aside its convey
nnre as in fraud of creditors, 154 A L R
913

Remedy of genersl creditor or judgment
creditor as affected by Uniform Frandu
lent Conveyance Act, 66 A L R 251, 119
A L R 949
Remedy of judgment creditor where
debtor surrenders property to vendee no
der prior security deed, 36 A L R 805
Right of creditor of decedent, before
perfecting his claim or after loss of re
course against decedent's estate, to pursue
remedy against property conveyed by the
decedent in fraud of his creditors, 103
A L R 555
Right of creditor or one representing
him to recover money paid uf property
transferred by debtor on illegal considers
tion, 84 A L R 1297
Right of creditors of one spouse, either
before or after death of other spouse, to
attack conveyance or encumbrance of es
tate by entireties by both spouses as in
fraud of creditors, 121 A L R 1028
Right of creditor to benefit of redemp
tion from, acquisition or extinction of,
outstanding right, title, or interest, by
grantee or transferee in fraud of creditors,
87 A L R 830
Right of creditor to set aside fraudu
lent transfer as affected by bankruptcy
of debtor, 158 A L R 1274
Right of creditor to set aside transfer
of property as fraudulent as affected by
the fact that his claim is barred by stat
ute of limitations, 14 A L R 2d 598
Right of individual creditor, or creditors
of debtor in liquidation or receivership
to maintain bill to set aside conveyances
or transfers in fraud of creditors, 119
A L R 1339
Right to attack and conditions of at
tack upon conveyance, mortgage or trans
fer as fraudulent as against creditors as
affected bv mortgage or other security for
indebtedness to attacking creditors, 116
A L R 1048
Tort claimant's right to attack convey
ance or transfer as fraudulent, 39 A L R
175,73 A L R 2d 749

25 116 Rights of creditors with claims not matured —Where a conxejance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor whose
claim has not matured, he may proceed in a court of competent junsdic
tion against an\ person against whom he could have proceeded, had his
claim matured, and the court may
(1) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property ,
(2) Appoint a recener to take charge of the propert} ,
(3) Set aside the coineyance or annul the obligation, or,
(4) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require
356

History L 1026, ch 42. § 10, R 8 1933
* O 1943, 33-1 16
Collateral References.
Fraudulent Conveyances<*=»217
37 C 7 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 74
37 Am Jur 2d 788 et seq , Fraudulent
Conveyances } 106 et seq
Admissibility of declarations of grantor
or transferor on issue as to whether con
vejance or transfer was in fraud of credl
tors, 83 A L R 1446
Admissibility of subsequent declarations
of vendor on issue whether sale was in
fraud of creditors, 64 A L R 797
Creditor's receipt of proceeds of convey
ance or transfer by debtor as estopping
him to claim that conveyance or transfer
was fraudulent, 9 A L R 358
Death of grantee or transferee of prop
ertv conveyed or transferred in fraud of
creditors as affecting rights of creditors of
grantor or transferor to attach same, 116
A L R 1196
Denying relief to one who conveyed
his property to defraud his creditors as
applicable where the threatened claim
which occasioned the conveyance was paid
or was never establshed, 21 A L R 2d
589
Juriadiction of equity to sequester, seize,
enjoin transfer of, or otherwiso provision
ally secure assets for application upon
money demand 1 which has not been re
duced to judgment, 116 A L R 270

25 3 4

Nece««nry parties defendant to action
to set aside conveyance in fraud of cred
itors, 24 A li R 2d 395
Necessity of exhausting remedies against
other judgment debtor before bringing
suit to sot aside conveyance as fraudulent,
22 A L R 200
Necessity of participation by the gran
tee or transferee in the fraud of the
grantor or transforor in order to avoid
a voluntary conveyance of transfer as
against creditors, 17 A L R 728
Right of creditor of docedent, before
perfecting his claim or after loss of re
course against decedent's estate, to pur
sue remedy agftinst property conveyed by
the decedent in fraud of his creditors,
103 A L R 555
Right of creditor to set aside fraudulent
transfer as affected by bankruptcy of
dol.tor, 158 A L R 1274
Right of stiroty or one secondarily liablo
to bring an action before payment of ob
ligation to set aside fraudulent convey
nnccs by principal, 71 A L R 154
Right of tort claimant to attack convey
ance or transfer as fraudulent, 39 A L R
175, 73 A L R 2d 749
Right to attack and conditions of attack
upon conveyance, mortgage or transfer as
fraudulent as against creditors as affected
by mortgage or other security for in
ilehtedness to attacking creditor, 116 A
L R 1048

CHAPTER 2
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK
(Repealed by Laws 1965 ch 164, § 10 102)

25 2 1 to 25 2 5

Repealed.

Repeal.
Sections 25 2 1 to 25 2 5 (L 1923, ch
92, §5 1 to 5 , R 8 1933 k C 1943, 33 2 1
to 33 2 5 ) , relating to sale of merchandise

in bulk were repealed by Laws 1965, ch
154, $ 10 102 For present provisions, seo
70A 6 101 et seq

CHAPTER 3
LEASES AND SALES OP LIVESTOCK
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch 164, § 10 102)

25-3 1 to 25 3 4

Repealed.

Repeal
Sections 25 3 1 to 25 1 4 (L 1<>17, ch
52, SSI to 4, C L 1917, §* 130 to 133
L 1921, ch 3 , 5 1 , B 8 1933 ft C 1943,

357

3 1 1 1 to 3 1 3 4), relating to lentea and
*ales of livestock were repealed br Laws
106% ch 154 § 10 102

